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Reformist Momentum in Mexico: A US View
by Alexander F. Watson
would like to highlight that 
improved relations with Mex­
ico parallel a fundamental 
change in the overall relations 
of the US with Latin America. 
After a difficult decade of eco­
nomic reversals, the region has im­
plem ented far-reaching political 
and economic reforms that have 
contributed to an economic up­
turn that has attracted investors 
worldwide. Mexico has led the way 
on many of these initiatives and we 
are confident that the im plementa­
tion of the North American Free 
Trade Agreem ent (NAFTA) will 
open up further opportunities for 
investment, while adding to our ca­
pacity to export to its growing do­
mestic market.
At the same time, the uprising 
in Chiapas illustrated the serious 
challenges Mexico and other coun­
tries in the region face in address­
ing the still unresolved issues of 
poverty and lack of opportunity for 
im portant sectors of society. The 
legitimate grievances of the people 
of southern Mexico were neither 
caused by NAFTA, nor should 
NAFTA be in any way com pro­
mised by these developments. 
Indeed, the events in Chiapas 
dem onstrated more clearly than 
ever the need for NAFTA.
With NAFTA, Mexico will con­
tinue on the path of free-market re­
form, providing the private sector
AlexanderF. Watson is US assistant 
secretary of state. This article was ex­
cerpted from testimony before the House 
Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere 
Affairs, February 2, 1994. It was de­
livered before the March 1994 assassi­
nation of the Partido Revolucionario 
Institucional's official presidential 
candidate, Luis Donaldo Colosio.
with strong incentives to energize 
the country’s economy and attract 
foreign investment. With NAFTA, 
Mexico will be drawn further into 
the Western community of nations, 
a community in which free-market 
reforms are closely linked with the 
political legitimacy that stems from 
open, free, and democratic politics. 
The US is confident that the Mexi­
can government has responded to 
the situation in Chiapas in a forth­
coming and responsible way. We 
hope that developments since the 
Chiapas uprising will further en­
hance democratic reform, rather 
than jeopardize it.
Chiapas, Economic Reforms, 
and NAFTA
While the problems of Chiapas date 
back centuries, recent changes in 
the Mexican and global economies 
have certainly contributed to social 
upheaval in southern Mexico. As 
the Mexican government has in­
stituted financial, economic, and 
trade reforms—steps that we have 
seen as crucial to long-term growth 
and stability—there have been 
shocks to its economy, particularly 
to those sectors that were ineffi­
cient or protected from competi­
tion. In Chiapas, 58% of the 
population is dependent upon 
agriculture for its livelihood. Gov­
ernm ent efforts to modernize the 
agricultural sector through land re­
form and changes in support pro­
grams, coupled with worldwide 
declines in commodity prices for 
some of the state’s main crops, 
have impacted significantly on this 
sizeable segment of the Chiapas 
economy. Chiapas has been tar­
geted by the Salinas government to 
receive a large share of funds from 
government programs designed to
provide for a social safety net dur­
ing the period of economic reform.
O ne of the most significant as­
pects of the economic reforms of 
the Salinas administration has been 
the successful conclusion of NAFTA. 
NAFTA entered into force on Janu­
ary 1 and has begun to permanently 
alter the trading patterns of North 
America. The opening of the Mexi­
can economy will increase overall 
economic efficiency and growth, 
but that growth will benefit some 
regions m ore than others at the 
outset. It is up to the Mexican gov­
ernm ent to best use its fiscal and 
social policies to redistribute the 
benefits of growth to include re­
gions of slower growth. The Mexi­
can government understands this 
need and is committed to increase 
its social expenditures in Chiapas.
The first phase of NAFTA imple­
m entation is fully under way. Re­
ports indicate that it is proceeding 
with few difficulties. Amb. Jim  Jones 
reports that our embassy and con­
sulates are being inundated with 
inquiries from US businessmen 
and women seeking information 
on doing business in Mexico. The 
inaugural meeting of the NAFTA 
Commission was held in Mexico 
City on January 14 and addressed a 
num ber of crucial im plementation 
issues, including the creation of the 
NAFTA secretariat. Representatives 
from the Departments of State and 
Labor and the Environmental Pro­
tection Agency continue to work 
with their Mexican and Canadian 
counterparts on organizing the 
commissions required in the labor 
and environm ent supplemental 
agreements and the Border Envi­
ronm ental Cooperation Agreement.
In their initial “declaration of 
war,” the Ejercito Zapatista de Libe- 
racion Nacional (EZLN) deemed
2 Hem isphere  •  W inter/Spring 1994
N T A R Y
NAFTA the death knell for the In­
dians of Chiapas. I do not accept 
that judgm ent. Such a statem ent is 
little more than EZLN rhetoric that 
makes for catchy headlines. The 
EZLN itself claims to have been 
preparing for its “war” for some 
10 years—obviously long before 
NAFTA was on the table.
NAFTA is not the cause of the 
social and economic inequalities in 
Chiapas that spawned the uprising 
any more than NAFTA can be 
blamed for poverty or social ten­
sions elsewhere in Mexico or the 
rest of North America. NAFTA 
only became operational on Janu­
ary 1, 1994. But make no mistake 
about the expectations of the Clin­
ton administration. NAFTA by it­
self is not viewed as the panacea to 
those problems. As the majority of 
economic studies project, NAFTA 
will increase trade and investment 
flows among the partners and stim­
ulate the economies of all three. 
This will lead to job  creation and al­
low for more balanced development 
throughout Mexico. To quote Spe­
cial Trade Representative Mickey 
Kantor from remarks made at the 
January 14 inaugural session of the 
NAFTA Commission: “The idea of 
NAFTA is to raise standards of liv­
ing, to increase economies, to make 
all of North America more com­
petitive. That creates jobs, [and] 
the ability of all three countries to 
create jobs and to raise their stand­
ards of living obviously addresses 
grievances that many have in all 
three countries.”
As it comes into full im plementa­
tion, NAFTA will bring some dislo­
cations to segments of the economies 
of all three NAFTA partners. It has 
been suggested that corn producers 
in Mexico—corn is a primary crop 
in Chiapas—will suffer dispropor­
tionately from NAFTA’s opening of 
the Mexican m arket to cheaper 
and more efficiently produced US 
corn. The importance of corn pro­
duction to the Mexican economy 
was taken into consideration in 
NAFTA as witnessed in the long 
phase-in period of the corn provi­
sions: 15 years, almost a generation.
NAFTA is not the 
cause of the social and 
economic inequalities in 
Chiapas that spaxxmed 
the uprising any more 
titan NAFTA can be 
blamed for poverty 
or social tensions 
elsewhere in Mexico.
In addition, the Salinas adminis­
tration announced in October of
1993 a new income support pro­
gram for subsistence farmers, in­
cluding corn growers, known as 
PROCAMPO. It will provide direct 
income support to farmers who gen­
erally have not benefited from past 
Mexican price support programs.
At the same time, it is designed to 
be phased out over the 15 years 
scheduled for NAFTA im plemen­
tation. In 1994 alone, the Mexican 
government will spend $3.5 billion 
on PROCAMPO nationwide.
Furtherm ore, the NAFTA proc­
ess is m ore than a closer linking of 
our trading patterns. This process 
accelerates a comprehensive inte­
gration of our two countries in 
many areas. It helps energize local
nongovernmental organizations 
(NGO’s) and forges links between 
them  and like-minded NGO’s in 
the international community. The 
process increases Mexican sensitivi­
ties toward democratic values and 
hum an rights. U nder NAFTA, Mex­
ico is now more than ever part of 
the “global village.”
Democratization in Mexico
As you know, Mexico has long been 
dom inated by the Partido Revolu- 
cionario Institucional (PRI), the po­
litical organization that emerged 
after the Mexican revolution. Over 
the years the PRI has provided Mex­
ico with considerable stability and 
presided over a remarkable trans­
formation of the country. It is also 
acknowledged by most observers 
that the prom inence of the PRI has 
historically discouraged the devel­
opm ent of an open and competi­
tive democratic process.
Just as we are witnessing a re­
markable transformation in Mex­
ico, from a statist and protectionist 
economy toward an open economy 
that encourages free markets, we 
are also witnessing dramatic trans­
formations in the Mexican political 
system. U nder the leadership of 
President Carlos Salinas de Gortari, 
Mexico has taken bold steps to­
wards guaranteeing the protection 
of fundam ental hum an rights and 
permitting an open and fair dem o­
cratic process. For the first time in 
Mexico’s history, opposition parties 
have gained governorships in sev­
eral states and significantly im­
proved their representation in the 
legislature. Electoral reforms in 
1990 and 1993, including the Fed­
eral Electoral Processes and Institu­
tions Code, introduced reforms in 
voter registration, placed limits on
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campaign spending, and created 
an electoral court to adjudicate 
electoral disputes.
These reforms, however, failed 
to fully satisfy opposition parties 
concerned about the impartiality 
of the electoral authorities. During 
the 1994 elections in the state of 
Yucatan, opposition parties com­
plained of extensive fraud. It is for 
that reason that we welcomed the 
announcem ent on January 27 that 
all of the candidates for the presi­
dency in Mexico had reached an 
agreem ent entitled “Peace, Democ­
racy and Justice.” It recognized that 
a necessary and unavoidable condi­
tion to a just and lasting peace is 
the advancement of democracy 
through free elections. In the 
agreem ent the parties pledged 
to work for:
■ the impartiality of electoral au­
thorities;
■ perm anent access to voter lists 
and registration data;
■ equality in access to and coverage 
by the media;
■ the prevention of the use of pub­
lic funds and programs to favor 
particular parties or candidates;
• the revision of the rules for party 
financing;
■ the review of the points in the 
penal code that could restrict 
political rights;
■ the consideration of a special 
federal prosecutor for election- 
related crimes;
■ a consensus to work together for 
democracy and convocation, if 
warranted, of a special session of 
the congress to consider further 
reforms.
The US believes this accord, prop­
erly im plemented, will strengthen 
democratic practices precisely at a 
time when Mexico is moving to es­
tablish closer ties with the US and 
other democratic nations of the 
hemisphere.
It is a tribute to the strength of 
the Mexican political process that 
these watershed agreements have 
em erged less than a m onth after 
the incidents in Chiapas. Chiapas,
rather than representing a reversal 
in the process of economic and po­
litical transformation in Mexico, 
has proven to be an energizing 
factor contributing to a deepening 
of the reform process. We hope 
and expect that this process will 
continue. The US has been sup­
portive of democratic opening in 
Mexico. We have discussed fre­
quently with Mexican officials our 
willingness to cooperate in ways 
that are in full conformity with 
Mexican law. The US State Depart­
m ent has also met with NGO’s to 
discuss how they might be able to 
assist Mexican NGO’s in ensuring 
the full im plementation of elec­
toral laws.
In closing I would like to reiter­
ate that we view with great opti­
mism the developm ent of closer 
ties with Mexico and applaud the 
process of economic reform and 
political opening that is taking 
place in that country. The US looks 
forward to deepening ties with Mex­
ico and working fully with whom­
ever the Mexican people elect as 
their leaders in the upcoming presi­
dential race. We are confident that 
NAFTA’s implementation will con­
tinue to improve relations between 
our countries in the years ahead.
In the afterm ath of Chiapas, we are 
also mindful of the fact that Mex­
ico, as well as o ther countries in the 
hemisphere, need to pay more at­
tention to the plight of those sectors 
of the population that have been 
left behind by the swift changes of 
m odern life.
Just as President Clinton has em­
phasized the need to address many 
of the basic and fundam ental social 
problems that we continue to face 
in the US, we welcome the renewed 
com m itm ent of Mexico toward ad­
dressing the problems of poverty 
and inequality. A policy of peace, 
reconciliation, and democratic 
reform, with respect for hum an 
rights, will help strengthen the ties 
of our people on both sides of the 
border. O ur own principles call for 
nothing less in the conduct of one 
of our most im portant bilateral 
relationships. ■
{  -- -------------------------------- X
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Commentary
The Past Six Years: A Review and Revisit
by Anthony P. Maingot
I
t was six years ago that I wrote 
my first commentary for Hemi­
sphere. As I write my last one 
as editor of the magazine, it 
makes sense to revisit the main 
issues of that 1988 editorial 
and take stock.
Six years ago the emphasis was 
on the changing patterns of trade 
and the challenges these presented 
to the Caribbean region. Specifi­
cally I asked a question that was 
neither particularly original nor 
new: whether the small Caribbean 
nation-state, characterized by deep­
ly held concepts of sovereignty and 
the individualism typical of insular 
societies, was the best institutional 
base from which to confront the 
challenges so clearly on the hori­
zon. The question is still valid be­
cause it is still unanswered. And yet, 
six years later it no longer seems 
like the most urgent issue.
The most pressing issue today is 
whether, even as quite individualis­
tic societies, enough regional sense 
exists to understand that given the 
nature of their problems, Carib­
bean nations have to cooperate 
with each other. It is, after all, in 
this age of domestic and interna­
tional restructuring, relatively easy 
to score some good hits on Carib­
bean leaders for not acting with 
greater unity and more forcefully.
In this regard, however, it is im por­
tant to note that not all the tenden­
cies have been discouraging; both
Anthony P. Maingot, founding editor 
(^Hem isphere, steps down from this 
post effective with the publication of this 
issue. His successor is political scientist 
Eduardo A. Gamarra, who is acting 
director of the Latin American and 
Caribbean Center at Florida Interna­
tional University.
the positive and the negative trends 
have to be analyzed so as not to fall 
into the general gloominess and 
pessimism that today appears to 
predom inate am ong Caribbeanists.
I Inflexible concepts of 
sovereignty have to 
make way for collective, 
intraregional and 
international links that 
can assist in confronting 
the calamity that 
threatens to overwhelm 
democratic structures 
everywhere.
On the negative side, one has to 
reiterate that despite the never-end­
ing agreements to form unions of 
one sort or the other—the latest 
being the Association of Caribbean 
States—actual behavior shows the 
persistence of centrifugal rather 
than centripetal forces. Not even 
the generalized threats to the Car­
ibbean’s traditional exports and, 
perhaps even more immediately, 
to those nontraditional industries 
that the Caribbean Basin Initiative 
engendered and prom oted seem 
to support effective collective ac­
tion. If the North American Free 
Trade Agreem ent (NAFTA) m en­
aces the region’s garm ent and as­
sembly industries, then Jamaica and 
Trinidad and Tobago—leaders of 
CARICOM—decide to apply for en­
try into NAFTA on their own. The 
Dominican Republic, rebuffed by 
CARICOM, pursues the same route.
Positive Trends
Before we dwell totally on such 
lamentable individualism, however, 
it is good to analyze some of the 
positive trends in Caribbean col­
laboration. These tend to be in the 
political and m ore symbolic arenas. 
This was the case of the political ob­
servers and workers sent in 1987 
and 1990 by islands such as St.
Lucia and Dominica to help the 
Haitian people’s efforts at estab­
lishing democracy. Having partici­
pated extensively in both attempts 
myself, I marvelled at the effective­
ness with which hundreds of Creole­
speaking West Indians operated in 
this once forbidden land. The hope, 
lit bright by those experiences and 
now dimmed by tyranny, should 
no t be allowed to die out.
A nother trend that honors the 
incipient spirit of pan-Caribbean 
collaboration is CARICOM’s open­
ing towards Cuba. Just like Willie 
B randt’s Oostpolitik, so condem ned 
by President Ronald Reagan, open­
ing doors and establishing bridges 
are vital to an eventual democratiza­
tion of Cuba just as they had been 
in the East German case. The West 
Indian aggiomamento towards Cuba 
has had to face the hostility of two 
American administrations and di­
rect threats from im portant mem­
bers of the US Congress. And yet, 
seldom in the past has there been 
such a solid front on a Caribbean 
issue. In virtually every Caribbean 
state, labor unions, the private sec­
tor, and government have signaled 
their common will to trade and ne­
gotiate with Cuba and to keep the 
lines of communication open. Even 
conservative governments, such as 
that of Eugenia Charles in Domi­
nica for instance, understand what 
only the US administration refuses
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to adm it publicly: that the Cold 
War is over not only for the likes 
of China and Vietnam but also for 
Cuba, and that the best way to fa­
cilitate a peaceful transition to de­
mocracy is through contacts and 
interaction, not isolation.
What emerges from an analysis 
of these positive trends is the role 
of democracy, the most im portant 
“symbolic capital” that most of 
these small states enjoy. It is as de­
mocracies that they participated in 
Haiti, answered the threats from 
the US Congress, and invariably 
m eet the conditions on respect for 
hum an rights now commonly set 
by multilateral lending agencies. It 
is this democracy that, sustained by 
educated and mobilized popula­
tions, is the best guarantee that the 
small states will manage to ride out 
the very rough economic times 
ahead.
All of which leads me to believe 
that the threats to these dem ocra­
cies will not come mainly from the 
reorientation of trade and invest­
m ent flows. They will come rather
from the internationalization of 
corruption and the crime and vio­
lence that invariably accompany it. 
The damage this can do to small so­
cieties is already palpably evident.
Drugs and Venality
In island after island, the effects of 
drug usage and the venality that 
comes with the drug trade are 
threatening the very sinews of the 
society. In Puerto Rico the Na­
tional Guard is deployed to fight 
what has to be called a war of the 
narcotraffickers against the society. 
Trinidad is caught in the grips of 
an unprecedented crime wave and 
revelations of high-level collusion 
with Latin American Mafiosi shake 
the society all too frequently. Cura­
sao, according to the Dutch press, 
has become the center of a Colom- 
bian-European-US drug syndicate, 
while urban Jamaica is divided into 
political enclaves best called “garri­
son constituencies.”
There are, of course, islands 
where there is little common crime
and violence but m uch corruption. 
Dutch St. Maarten, for instance, is 
littered with fancy private jets carry­
ing mysterious passengers to enig­
matic destinations. The point is 
that there is hardly a society in the 
Caribbean that has escaped the rav­
ages that local greed and the insa­
tiable North American dem and for 
drugs have wrought.
And so, as im portant as the 
problems of trade and investment 
are, the fundam ental task facing 
Caribbean elites is to strengthen 
the democratic state by making it 
more accountable and transparent. 
Inflexible concepts of sovereignty 
have to make way for collective, 
intraregional and international 
links and cooperative arrange­
ments that can assist in confront­
ing the calamity that threatens to 
overwhelm democratic structures 
everywhere. Caribbean unity and 
collaboration is needed not just to 
negotiate its economic destiny but 
also to safeguard those democratic 
institutions that make the world re­
spect the region’s voice at all. ■
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Cuba’s New Capitalists
by David Adams
I
t ’s 8 p.m., pouring rain, and 
the Miramar district of West 
Havana is without electricity 
again. The streets are deserted, 
a few candles blink from apart­
m ent windows, and Cubans 
settle down for another long, dreary 
night. Down one potholed street, 
however, things are hum m ing— 
literally. Through the rain can be 
heard the rum ble of a generator, 
a rare sound indeed in a Cuba 
starved of all consumer items, in­
cluding fuel supplies. More than 
just the background score for a 
good time, it’s the sound of Cuba’s 
clandestine economy.
Communism may grind to a halt 
when the power is out, but Cuba’s 
new capitalists d on’t stop for any­
thing. In July 1993 Fidel Castro 
legalized the use of the US dollar 
after 30 years of “anti-gringo” rhet­
oric. Millions of those dollars are 
now pouring into the island from 
Cuban exiles in Miami anxious to 
assist needy relatives. The roar of 
that dollar flood lets Cuba’s new 
capitalists know they have a lot of 
catching up to do.
Guided by four young Cubans, I 
run towards a brightly illuminated 
porch, dodging the rain under sag­
ging tree branches. There is laugh­
ter and music inside. “Oye, Pedro! 
Open up, we’re here,” shouts one 
of my companions, knocking on 
the door with his fist. The door 
opens and a smiling Pedro emerges. 
“Welcome. You’re late,” he says. 
“W ho’s he?” he asks, looking suspi­
ciously at me. “H e’s the journalist 
we told you about,” answers Ramon, 
one of the young m en with me.
David Adams is a Latin America corre­
spondent f  err the Times (London).
“Look,” Pedro says with a menacing 
grin, ‘just be careful not to write 
anything about me. I ’ll be screwed, 
and you will be, too.”
Pedro is a “maceta,” Cuban slang 
for the mafia of black marketeers 
who are emerging ever more openly 
from the shadows of a dying revolu­
tion that is already beginning to 
live a savage postcommunist brand 
of capitalism. The “liberation” of 
the dollar is underm ining the egali­
tarian principles of the revolution, 
opening the door to corruption 
and creating a new class of Cubans 
who live, work, and eat outside the 
reach of the socialist state.
In 1990 Castro announced a 
“special period for times of peace”: 
an austerity plan on a wartime scale 
intended to help Cuba survive the 
breakup of the Soviet bloc and the 
loss of foreign subsidies and oil
supplies. During this special pe­
riod, economic conditions in Cuba 
have grown steadily worse. Televi­
sion programs are now teaching 
Cubans how to make their own 
candles, how to bake fruit rinds as 
m eat substitutes, how to make their 
own toothpaste and deodorant, 
and how to grow medicinal herbs. 
Meanwhile, those with access to 
dollars can shop at well-stocked— 
but expensive—supermarkets 
known as “diplo-stores.” Cubans 
call it “diplo-communism.”
A Secret Restaurant
In the air-conditioned comfort of 
the dining room  in his cramped 
home, Pedro has started a secret 
restaurant— Chez Pedro. There is on­
ly one table (reservations accepted) 
so he can claim that his customers 
are guests if the police arrive. Pedro 
is not his real name and he doesn’t 
like the word “maceta” either. The 
term literally means “ham m er,” re­
flecting the mafia’s reputation as 
hardened criminals with economic 
power. “I prefer trafficker," he says. 
His aim in life: “I want to live like 
Michael Jackson and work like 
Pablo Escobar.”
In a country where most people 
travel by bicycle, Pedro has five cars, 
although they are all beat-up Soviet 
Ladas. “Hey, a Lada is like a limou­
sine in Cuba,” he says. Petrol may be 
hard to come by, but no t for Pedro. 
He has gallons of the stuff hoarded. 
In Cuba all property is owned by 
the state, and moving house con­
sists of a swap where no money 
changes hands. But Pedro owns 
several houses, including one in the 
luxury beach resort of Varadero.
Pedro began his life of crime 
some years ago. But since the dol­
lar ban was lifted, he says life has
The “liberation” 
of the dollar is 
undermining the 
egalitarian principles 
of the revolution, 
opening the door to 
corruption and 
creating a new class 
of Cubans who live, 
work, and eat outside 
the reach of the 
socialist state.
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never been better. Now it’s easier 
for him to conceal the source of 
his money. As he expands his busi­
ness operations, he estimates his 
earnings have jum ped about $15-
20,000, making him the equivalent 
o f a Cuban millionaire in pesos, 
and possibly one of the richest men 
in the country. On the black mar­
ket a dollar is worth 70 pesos today. 
While Pedro can make more than 
one million pesos a m onth, state 
salaries vary from only 148 pesos to 
600 pesos per m onth. “Pedro is the 
king of the macetas,” one of my 
friends tells me.
Most Cubans these days are 
forced to live on the rice and beans 
that they receive in monthly rations 
at subsidized state prices. Few Cu­
bans have eaten m eat or fish in 
months, even years. At Chez Pedro 
the m enu consists of lobster tail, 
marlin, shrimp, and pizza. My 
friends are lucky; they have rela­
tives in Miami who send them  dol­
lars. O ur meal, for five people, cost 
$82, or the equivalent of two years 
salary in a regular state job.
Eating in Pedro’s dining room  is 
like traveling back in time. An imi­
tation Tiffany lamp sheds an uneven 
light over a dining table complete 
with china plates and engraved 
wine glasses in silver vessels. The ta­
ble is adorned with silver pheasants 
and assorted art-deco knickknacks. 
Marble and bronze statues—one 
about six feet tall by a French sculp­
tress—dom inate two corners of the 
small room. A forged Rene Porto- 
carrero hangs on the wall in a 
splendidly elaborate gold-painted 
wooden frame. Everything is for 
sale: the forged painting for $5,000; 
the genuine statue for $8,000.
“Anything to drink gentlem en?” 
A waiter dressed in a tall, white 
ch e f s hat and long white apron
has entered. A bottle of sparkling 
Spanish wine is selected while my 
fellow diners opt for a Detroit 
“Piels” beer, smuggled past the 
30-year-old US trade embargo 
against Cuba.
There was a time 
when Cubans feared 
the authority of the 
state, and taking 
liberties with the 
communist system 
was deemed too risky. 
Not today.
“I swear to you that there’s noth­
ing you can request that I cannot 
supply,” boasts Pedro, who has 
jo ined  us at the table. “I have my 
contacts. D on’t ask me where,” he 
adds. My friends explain that Pedro 
has bought “access” at every tourist 
hotel and restaurant in Havana. 
Anything he needs can be stolen at 
the drop of a hat. Bribery and con­
tacts are what count in the last days 
of communism. I d o n ’t look con­
vinced, so Pedro leaves the room 
and comes back with a small 1929 
Gil Garcia painting—genuine, but 
stolen—a West German syringe, 
and a dozen tiny bottles of m or­
phine. “Satisfied? You want cocaine, 
marijuana, just let me know. OK?” 
Sitting next to me, Jose, a sur­
geon from the Calixto Garcia hospi­
tal, is shocked. “Do you know how 
hard it is for me to get m orphine?” 
he says and launches into a de­
tailed description of the shortages 
at one of Cuba’s top medical insti­
tutions. Public health, one of the 
most vaunted achievements of the 
Cuban revolution, is having to cut 
all sorts of corners to make do. The 
laundry room  cannot cope due to 
the power cuts, so patients must 
bring their own sheets. Doctors are 
allowed one bar of soap per m onth 
to wash their hands. Jose is due to 
attend a medical conference abroad 
next m onth. He plans to defect and 
fly to Miami.
Self-Employment Pays
Efigenio would like to leave, too, 
but he knows his chances are slim. 
So he is making the best of a new 
opportunity offered by the revolu­
tion to go into private business. In 
Septem ber 1993 the government 
decreed that nonprofessionals 
could apply for licenses to become 
self-employed in simple trades. Efi­
genio is a highly qualified under­
water engineer and diver, but he 
was laid off from his regular job 
cleaning ship bottoms in the port 
of Havana. Cuba’s maritime com­
merce has fallen drastically since 
the breakdown of trade relations 
with former communist allies in 
eastern Europe.
He still receives 40% of his 
monthly salary, which amounts to 
about $3, to support his wife and 
two children. But since September, 
Efigenio and a friend have been il­
legally fishing and diving for lob­
ster every m orning near where he 
lives on Havana’s sea front, the 
Malecon. He hasn’t applied for a 
government license and doesn’t 
intend to. “They won’t give me
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one. They want the lobsters for the 
tourists,” he says, pointing out that 
there is a 500-peso fine for fishing 
lobsters illegally.
He may be right. At Cuba’s most 
exclusive “foreigners-and-dollars- 
only” supermarket near the old 
Soviet embassy, Cuban lobster is 
being sold for $23 a pound. Cuban 
shops d o n ’t have it. In fact, Cuban 
shops d on’t have any fish at all, or 
meat, or fruit, or . . . the list is end­
less. Efigenio sells his lobsters on 
the black m arket for 80 pesos a 
pound, or $1.15. O ne night he and 
his partner made 1,500 pesos fish­
ing two hours each morning, and 
he expects to double that soon.
According to the Cuban govern­
ment, more than 19,000 people 
have requested self-employment li­
censes since Septem ber 1993. The 
old communist party bureaucracy 
is having trouble coping with the 
stampede for capitalism. Long 
queues have developed outside 
labor ministry offices, requesting 
licenses for taxicab drivers, hair­
dressers, and bicycle and shoe 
repairpersons.
Enthusiasm for Dollars
When I met Eduardo at a friend’s 
house and he told me that he 
planned to start his own food 
stand, I decided to follow him 
through the application process.
I was surprised when he said he 
thought it could be done in a day. 
But then I d id n ’t count on Eduar­
d o ’s ingenuity and the new Cuban 
enthusiasm for making dollars. 
Eduardo appeared to have one 
major problem: he d idn’t have a 
job  or the necessary culinary back­
ground the law required to apply 
to work independently in food 
and beverages.
There was a time when Cubans 
feared the authority of the state, 
and taking liberties with the com­
munist system was deem ed too 
risky. Not today. Eduardo laughed 
when I suggested that what he was 
about to do m ight get him in troub­
le. “No one is frightened anymore. 
We’re too busy surviving,” he said.
I offered to help by driving him 
around Havana in my rented car.
I was running low on petrol and 
Eduardo said he knew where we 
could fill up quickly. A few minutes 
later I watched Eduardo suck petrol 
from a government ministry truck 
with a hose, directly into the tank 
of my car, in broad daylight. So 
much for fear.
Although the 
communist party 
remains firmly in 
control in Cuba, it 
has become almost 
irrelevant to the needs 
of society as it is 
increasingly less able 
to provide the basic 
necessities and social 
services it so proudly 
claims are the rights of 
every citizen.
Next we visited Eduardo’s friend, 
who had, at least until it closed in 
September of 1993, managed a 
large state factory. He neatly typed 
out a false reference for Eduardo 
saying he had worked as the cook 
at the factory for the last five years 
and was a model of “revolutionary 
discipline.”
Earlier in the day, Eduardo had 
dropped in at the ministry of labor 
to spy out the lay of the land. He 
struck up a conversation with a 
young woman in the office and 
agreed to pay her $5 to hurry his 
paperwork through. When we re­
turned with the reference, I waited 
in the car while Eduardo entered
the ministry. He was back trium­
phantly in less than 10 minutes with 
the approval in his hand.
There are thousands of Eduardo’s 
doing precisely the same thing all 
over Havana, some legally, others 
not. There’s Jose, the electronic 
genius who makes his own satellite 
dish TV receivers out of oil cans so 
he can watch CNN. He steals the 
signal from a large tourist hotel and 
charges $70 to install the homemade 
equipment. And there’s Juan, who 
washes the tourists’ cars outside the 
Riviera Hotel. He was chatting with a 
police officer when I thanked him 
for cleaning my car. We joked that a 
few weeks ago the officer would have 
arrested Juan for accepting the $1 
bill I paid him. Nowjuan is making 
more in one day than the police of­
ficer is paid in two months. “I’m 
getting rid of this,” says the police 
officer about his uniform. “I want to 
go to the countryside and raise 
pigs,” he adds.
Irrelevant Party
The communist party, reeling from 
one economic crisis to another, is 
in no position to tell the people 
what to do. Although the party re­
mains firmly in control in Cuba, it 
has become almost irrelevant to 
the needs of society as it is increas­
ingly less able to provide the basic 
necessities and social services it so 
proudly claims are the rights of 
every citizen. “They know they 
can’t feed us. At least they let us 
feed ourselves,” says Eduardo.
The fate of the revolution hangs 
in the balance and the direction of 
recent reforms remains unclear as 
it plots a course through unchar­
tered waters. Meanwhile, in Miami, 
Cuban exiles are waiting for what 
they believe is an inevitable popu­
lar uprising against Castro.
But back at Pedro’s restaurant, 
the talk is not of counterrevolution. 
“I hope Fidel never falls,” says Pedro. 
“Everything I have, all this,” he says, 
spreading his arms, “I owe it all to 
Fidel. I’m grateful to Fidel. Do you 
think I could survive if the Miami 
exiles take over this country?” ■
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Cardenas, PRI, and the US Vote
by Sallie Hughes
I
n April 1993 Cuauhtem oc Car­
denas rallied striking Mexican 
mushroom  pickers in Pennsyl­
vania. In August, in Tijuana, he 
m et with Mexican-Americans 
setdng up a US election cam­
paign committee. The then un­
official presidential candidate for 
Mexico’s Partido Revolucionario 
Democratico (PRD) was on the 
stump again in the US. But unlike 
1988, when he barnstorm ed the US 
claiming electoral fraud after his 
failed presidential bid, Cardenas 
will face competition for the sup­
port of the 5-7 million Mexicans 
who live in the US.
A m ore aggressive and better 
organized Partido Revolucionario 
Institucional (PRI) has jo ined the 
battle for the hearts and minds—as 
well as money and votes—of Mexi­
cans living north of the border.
“We are working hard to present 
our version of things,” said Martin 
Torres, PRI subdirector of interna­
tional affairs.
From as far away as Pennsylvania 
and as near as San Diego, 30 groups 
representing hundreds of Mexican 
farm workers and environmental 
and hum an rights organizations in 
the US met with Cardenas in Au­
gust 1993 in Tijuana. Officially they 
pushed for fair elections. Unoffi­
cially they came out to support 
Cardenas, who still represents the 
strongest challenge to continued 
PRI control of the Mexican presi­
dency. “We have a lot of interest in 
m aintaining and reinforcing our 
ties with the Mexican community in 
the United States,” Cardenas said.
Sallie Hughes is a political reporter for 
El Financiero International, an 
English-language weekly based in 
Mexico City.
Cardenas first toured the US in 
1985 as the PRI governor of the 
central Mexican state of Michoacan, 
addressing cheering migrant work­
ers in Washington state’s Yakima 
Valley. Since then he has traveled 
to Texas, California, New Mexico, 
Louisiana, Pennsylvania, Illinois, 
and New York. To the chagrin of 
the Salinas de Gortari administra­
tion, Cardenas has talked during 
his more recent trips about elec­
toral fraud in Mexico and his own 
version of a free trade agreement.
PRI has worked 
vigorously to bring 
Mexican workers 
in the US back into 
its fold.
According to Rodolfo Elizondo, 
the secretary for international rela­
tions of the conservative opposition 
Partido Accion Nacional (PAN), the 
PAN has taken its cue from the PRD 
and stepped up its efforts in the 
US, as well. The first PAN newslet­
ter, Accion Intemacional, was mailed 
to Mexican leaders in the US in 
August 1993. PAN president Carlos 
Castillo attended conferences at 
seven US border-state universities 
and m et with Mexican leaders in 
each community. Interim  PAN 
governor Carlos Medina of Guana­
juato  also visited the US in the fall 
of 1993.
But the biggest response to the 
Cardenas challenge comes from 
President Salinas and the PRI. Sali­
nas has worked vigorously to bring 
Mexican workers in the US back 
into the PRI fold. Since Salinas 
took office amid protests on both 
sides of the border, the govern­
m ent has visibly prom oted educa­
tional, cultural, and hum an rights 
programs for Mexicans in the US, 
consular employees in San Diego 
said. The six people on the hum an 
rights staff of the San Diego consu­
late, for example, filed 3,735 peti­
tions on behalf of 966 people in 
March 1993. In 1987 the staff of 
two oversaw an average of about 80 
petitions a month.
As another indicator of increased 
government activity, Mexico has 
opened, with government logistical 
support, 14 new cultural institutes 
in the US since 1991. Only the insti­
tute in San Antonio existed before 
Salinas took office.
Salinas has also extended his 
popular Solidaridad poverty alle­
viation program  to the US. Some 
analysts credit Solidaridad at home 
with rebuilding popular support 
for the PRI between 1988 and the 
congressional elections of 1991. Un­
der the name of Solidaridad Inter­
national, the basics of the program 
have been extended north.
In addition, in the past three 
years, the PRI has formed 16 new 
political committees in the US, and 
four more are near completion. 
Only a Los Angeles club officially 
existed in 1988, the PRI’s Torres 
said. Besides keeping a high com­
munity profile, the “Compatriot 
Support Committees” distribute 
practical information, such as the 
rights of aliens in the US and how 
a Mexican national can bring a car 
purchased in the US back into 
Mexico.
Since 1853, when form er presi­
dent Benito Juarez plotted his re­
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turn to Mexico after being exiled 
to New Orleans, the Mexican op­
position has occasionally sought re­
lief north  of the Rio Grande. The 
governm ent’s aggressive stance 
represents a new twist, one that 
acknowledges the importance of 
transnational political strategies in 
an era when the border exists as a 
boundary but not as a barrier.
The Role of the US Vote
The political support of Mexicans 
and Mexican-Americans in the US 
is im portant to candidates vying for 
Mexico’s presidency. If they voted 
as a bloc, the millions of Mexicans 
in the US could sway an election. 
For the m oment, however, forming 
such a bloc is almost impossible be­
cause the great majority of immi­
grants would have to return to 
their home communities in order 
to vote. Border state polling places 
only accept a small num ber of vot­
ers registered in o ther areas, ac­
cording to Torres. The PRD pushed 
to allow expatriates to vote in Mexi­
can consulates as part of a political 
reform package debated in the 
Mexican congress, but the pro­
posal never got a full hearing and 
died. In the past, it also has pushed 
for absentee balloting. The PRI re­
fused in both cases, citing the com­
plexity of guaranteeing a fraud-free 
election.
Mexican law prohibits an in­
fusion of campaign money from 
workers in the US. Even still, ana­
lysts point out that immigrant 
campaign money is a formidable 
attraction for Mexican political 
parties. Although political parties 
deny it, some observers think both 
the opposition and the PRI re­
ceived US campaign money in 
1988. Denise Dresser, of the Insti­
tu te Tecnologico Autonom o de 
Mexico, claims that PRI and PRD 
committees in Los Angeles raised 
money in 1988. “It is no t clear how 
much, but everybody knows that 
they did ,” she said.
Even a little money could help 
the PRD, whose campaign chest is 
bare when com pared with that of
the wealthy PRI, said Juan Molinar, 
a professor at the Colegio de Mexi­
co. People at the Cardenas m eet­
ing in Tijuana spoke of raising 
$1 million, a gesture Cardenas 
publicly refused.
Party strategists 
are emphasizing 
transborder efforts 
became they believe 
Mexican immigrants 
in the US are opinion 
leaders who can sway 
the vote of their 
compatriots at home.
An additional draw is the access 
im migrant groups have to the US 
media. In 1988 Cardenas and pro­
testing PRD sympathizers suc­
ceeded in widely publicizing their 
claims of electoral fraud. Some of 
the biggest anti-PRI dem onstra­
tions at the time were in front of 
Mexico’s consulate in Los Angeles. 
The new Cardenas group vowed to 
lobby the US Congress and Presi­
dent Bill Clinton on electoral and 
hum an rights issues. A represen­
tative of Jesse Jackson’s Rainbow 
Coalition agreed to add his group’s 
voice.
Campaigning in San Diego
Meanwhile, Salinas hopes the myr­
iad pro-government efforts will 
prom ote a positive image of the 
government, the coming presi­
dential elections, and the North 
American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA). Convincing San Diego 
residents of the merits of free trade 
is part of the reason why the Mexi­
can consulate there is keeping a 
higher profile, said Mexican consul 
Gustavo Iruegas. “It is easy to find 
people in San Diego who are not 
even familiar with Tijuana,” he 
added. The Mexican government 
spent about $32 million to prom ote 
NAFTA in the US in 1992, the com­
merce secretariat announced in 
Septem ber 1993.
Finally, party strategists are 
emphasizing transborder efforts 
because they believe Mexican im­
migrants in the US are opinion 
leaders who can sway the vote of 
their compatriots at home. Mexi­
cans living in the US maintain ex­
tremely strong ties to their hom e 
communities, especially in the 
southern states where Cardenas’s 
support is thought to be strong. 
Many return annually for saint’s 
day festivals and to provide finan­
cial support for relatives.
Leaders at Cardenas’s planning 
meeting said getting Mexicans in 
the US to convince their compatri­
ots at home to vote is a top priority. 
“We are telling people, ‘If you can­
not return hom e to vote, then be 
sure to call hom e and tell your 
friends and relatives,”’ said Raciel 
Garcia, a farm worker organizer 
who works near Palm Springs, Cali­
fornia. Economist Carol Zabin, who 
researches Mexican immigrants for 
both the University of California at 
Los Angeles and Tulane University, 
believes the PRD has a lot of work 
to do. “I d on’t perceive a big or­
ganizational effort. They need to 
get to villages on saint’s days and 
sign up the immigrants, or some­
thing like that.”
Despite its new efforts, the PRI 
is not assured of a US political fol­
lowing, either. Many Mexicans are 
in the US precisely because the 
economic policies of PRI adminis­
trations hurt them. One of those 
anti-PRI immigrants is Belen Rosas, 
who attended the Cardenas m eet­
ing on behalf of his organization 
of Oaxacan workers in California. 
“The vote here would represent a 
vote against the system,” he said. 
“We are here because the govern­
m ent ignores our communities.” ■
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Drugs Alter the Security Agenda
by Ivelaw L. Griffith
ataclysmic changes in in­
ternational politics and 
in the domestic politics 
of many countries around 
the globe since the late 
1980s have ushered in a 
new era in world politics—the post- 
Cold War era. Scholars and states­
m en are, as yet, unable to fully 
explain the close of the Cold War 
chapter in world history or to grasp 
all that the end of the era portends, 
but most of them  accept that one 
discernibly changed area is the 
security arena.
High-agenda security items like 
nuclear holocaust, the global arms 
race, and the Strategic Defense Ini­
tiative are being displaced by what 
Jam es Rosenau, a respected inter­
national relations scholar, calls 
“interdependence issues” (e.g., 
environmental concerns, AIDS, 
chronic debt, and international 
drug trafficking). These issues span 
national boundaries and cannot be 
addressed at the local or national 
level. O f course, the challenges of 
the post-Cold War period do not 
present uniform threats to nations, 
states, or regions. Neither, as a mat­
ter of fact, did the challenges of the 
Cold War era.
The post-Cold War security 
agenda is not only changing in 
content, but also in conception.
The nature of threats to nations 
and states in the contemporary 
world necessitate redefining the 
term “security” itself. It is becom-
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ing increasingly obvious that non­
military developments can and do 
pose genuine threats to nations 
and states; that in many regions the 
basis of threats is no longer exter­
nal, but internal; and, thus, that 
traditional ways of viewing counter­
measures often no longer hold.
The geonarcotics 
arena: where conflict 
and cooperation 
among national and 
international actors 
are driven by drugs.
As might be expected, scholars 
differ in their views and interpreta­
tions of the evolving post-Cold War 
political landscape and of the chal­
lenges that are likely to face nations 
in the era ahead. Stanley Hoffman 
of Harvard University, for example, 
anticipates the developm ent of dif­
ferent currencies of power affixed 
to different poles of international 
power: military^ economic and fi­
nancial? demographic, etc. Edward 
Luttwak of the Center for Strategic 
and International Studies in Wash­
ington envisages a new world order 
whose central feature will be geo­
economics—the admixture of the 
logic of conflict with the methods 
of commerce. Samuel Huntington 
of Harvard University’s Institute 
for Strategic Studies, on the other 
hand, challenges contentions that
economics will be the fundam ental 
source of world conflict. He sees 
culture as the key source of dis­
cord, asserting that “the clash of 
civilizations will dom inate global 
politics. The fault lines between 
civilizations will be the battle lines 
of the fu ture” (Foreign Affairs, Sum­
m er 1993).
None of these propositions are 
necessarily mutually exclusive, but 
one can sense that the post-Cold 
War international community will 
be devoting considerable time, ef­
fort, and resources to an interde­
pendence agenda item that falls 
outside the parameters of the 
propositions m entioned above. 
That agenda item is narcotics. In­
deed, the president of the 1993-94 
session of the UN General Assem­
bly, Amb. Rudy Insanally of Guy­
ana, rem arked prophetically in 
October 1993 that “the interna­
tional community’s success in con­
trolling drug abuse will serve as a 
litmus test of its ability to respond 
to the complex problems of the 
post-Cold War era.”
The Role of Geography
One can already discern the devel­
opm ent of what I call “geonarco­
tics”: significant relations of conflict 
and cooperation am ong national 
and international actors that are 
driven by drugs. Geography is a fac­
tor in this geonarcotics arena, not 
only because of the global special 
dimensions of drug operations, but 
also because the geographical fea­
tures of areas facilitate certain drug 
operations. For example, the physi­
cal geography of South America 
and Central and South Asia en­
hance the prospects and potential 
for cocaine and heroin production, 
respectively. And the Bahamian
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archipelago and other topographi­
cal features of Latin America and 
the Caribbean, and of Central, 
West, and Southeast Asia, facilitate 
drug trafficking. Power in the geo­
narcotics milieu is both state and 
nonstate in origin, with nonstate 
power brokers sometimes exercis­
ing more sway than some state 
agents. Consequently, in this mi­
lieu, politics, which involves re­
source allocation—determ ining 
who gets what, how, and when—is 
not only a function of state action.
The Caribbean is not exempt 
from having to pay increasing at­
tention to conflict and cooperation 
driven by drugs. The region’s major 
security concerns in the latter part 
of the Cold War era were foreign 
intervention, instability, and milita­
rization, with vulnerability as an all- 
encompassing dilemma. Now, in 
the early post-Cold War period, in­
stability and vulnerability remain, 
but the most critical problems re­
late to drugs. Not that drug prob­
lems are a creation of the new era; 
they were there before, but their 
scope and intensity, and the dimi­
nution in im portance of some 
other concerns, have pushed drugs 
to the top of the security agenda.
Contrary to the belief held by 
some people, there is no single 
“drug problem ” in the Caribbean. 
N either is there a single drug in­
volved. The problems relate to 
drug production, abuse, traffick­
ing, and money laundering. And 
the “danger drugs” are marijuana 
(popularly called ganja), cocaine, 
and heroin. Neither cocaine nor 
heroin is produced in the region, 
but these drugs—especially cocaine 
and its derivative, crack—present 
the major abuse headaches. There 
is trafficking in all three drugs, with, 
as should be expected, variation in 
trafficking sites, volumes, and kind 
of drugs. In regard to money laun­
dering, some countries are known 
or suspected; others are not. In any 
case, gone are the days when drugs 
in the Caribbean were merely a 
problem  in Jamaica, the Bahamas, 
or Belize. Now all countries—His­
panic and non-Hispanic—are part
of the action, in different ways, with 
different consequences.
Guyana, for example, unknown 
for major drug operations a decade 
ago, is now both a major ganja p ro­
ducer and cocaine transshipm ent 
location. In March 1993, for in­
stance, 117 pounds of cocaine were 
found aboard a Guyana Airways 
Corporation (GAC) plane in New 
York following its arrival from Guy­
ana. US Customs fined GAC $1.8 
million for this violation. Even more 
dramatic, in June 1993, police in 
Guyana confiscated 800 pounds of 
cocaine, US$24,000, hundreds of 
thousands of Colombian pesos, 
and thousands of Guyana dollars 
following an aborted transship­
m ent operation. Several Colom­
bians, Guyanese, and Venezuelans 
were implicated in the affair. And 
in early April 1994, a police raid at 
Karabese, along the Atlantic coast, 
resulted in the destruction of 14 
acres of ganja. The situation is so 
grave that President Cheddi Jagan 
has called for consideration of le­
galization as a counterm easure.
Drug-related crime 
has transformed the 
“paradise” character 
of many Caribbean 
vacation spots, driving 
fear into locals and 
foreigners alike, and 
depressing tourist 
activity.
These drug operations have 
security implications in that they 
threaten the physical and psycho­
logical safety of citizens and the 
governability of states in the re­
gion. There are several political, 
military, and economic conse­
quences, including corruption, 
arms trafficking, vigilantism, de­
pressed tourism, and increased 
crime. Close observers of the Car­
ibbean have known for some time 
what the New York Times reported 
on April 19, 1994: that drug-related 
crime has transformed the “para­
dise” character of the US Virgin 
Islands and other Caribbean vaca­
tion spots, driving fear into locals 
and foreigners alike, and depress­
ing tourist activity. Moreover, gov­
ernm ents in the region are forced 
to commit already scarce resources 
to the “war on drugs.” Thus, drugs 
present a real security dilemma for 
the Caribbean. The scope and in­
tensity of the threat vary from coun­
try to country, but to paraphrase 
Martin Carter, the distinguished 
Caribbean poet, the situation is 
such that “all are involved; all are 
consum ed.”
Many Fronts
Given the multidimensional nature 
of the problems, no single counter­
measure will suffice. Battles have to 
be waged simultaneously on several 
fronts: law enforcement, educa­
tion, interdiction, legislation, and 
rehabilitation, am ong others. All 
these require resources of various 
kinds. The problem  is, though, 
that Caribbean countries have se­
vere resource deficiencies, not only 
in terms of money, but also in terms 
of personnel, skills, and technology.
Domestic initiatives alone can­
not deal with the drug phenom e­
non. Regional and international 
action is necessary because the drug 
phenom enon is a transnational 
one—an interdependence issue. 
Governments alone cannot do what 
is required. Individual citizens and 
nonprofit organizations, in the Car­
ibbean and elsewhere, will need to 
contribute. Many already do. The 
casualties in the counternarcotics 
battles will be hum an as well as in­
stitutional. The battles will be long 
and hard. Yet, Caribbean govern­
ments and people have to remain 
engaged. W hether we like it or not, 
drugs will be part of the Caribbean 
security agenda for much of the 
foreseeable future. ■
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Teaching Classical Music in Haiti
by Robert M. Grenier
I
n July of 1993 I was invited to 
give vocal instruction at the 
Ecole Ste. Trinite, a private 
teaching institution supported 
by the Anglican Church in 
Haiti. I was one of a handful 
of volunteer music teachers from 
Canada and the US who instructed 
these students in an entire range of 
musical instruments—and in my 
case, voice—during the school’s 
three-week summer camp.
The course of study included 
class instruction in music theory 
and history, individual lessons on 
each student’s instrum ent, and 
participation in a variety of ensem­
bles. These ensembles consisted of 
the four separate wind and string 
groups divided into jun io r and 
senior categories respectively, a 
m en’s and boy’s chorus called Les 
Petits Chanteurs, and the full sym­
phony orchestra L’Orchestre Phil- 
harm onique Sainte Trinite. These 
six ensembles m et daily employing 
an entire student body ranging in 
age from seven and eight-year-olds 
to m ature adults.
Ecole Ste. Trinite may be con­
sidered one of the glories of the 
island for, in contrast to the physi­
cal decay that all too apparently 
plagues Port-au-Prince, it harbors 
one of the country’s great spiritual 
treasures: its talented youth. Every­
day these promising young people, 
along with their instructors, would 
follow a prescribed routine that 
appeared like some serene and 
confident gesture arising from the
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tum ult and misery surrounding the 
walled precinct of the school.
Each m orning at 9 a.m., under 
the stern gaze of their mentors, 100 
or so well-groomed, young Haitians 
assembled in the school’s courtyard 
to attend the ceremony of drapeau 
(flag raising). After the flag raising, 
there followed the official litany of 
prayers, scripture reading, hymns, 
and announcem ents. With obliga­
tions to both God and Caesar duly 
rendered, the business of making 
music took its param ount position 
in the imagination of all.
The orderly ranks broke only to 
be refashioned again in classrooms 
devoted to the study of theory, to 
participation in an ensemble, or to 
the business of practicing o n e’s in­
strument. The latter was done every­
where—in studios, classrooms, and 
rooftops. Much had to be learned 
in a short time, for at the end of 
the three-week program  would 
come two lengthy public concerts 
and num erous solo performances 
at six student recitals.
Situated in the heart of Port-au- 
Prince and adjacent to the Angli­
can Cathedral of Ste. Trinite, the 
Ecole Ste. Trinite consists of a se­
ries of interlocking structures that 
are quite evidently the result of sev­
eral building campaigns. Judging 
by the lack of accord am ong their 
designs and by the choice of build­
ing materials and even floor levels, 
each building seems to have been 
designed by a different architect.
Yet this seeming inharm onious jig­
saw arrangem ent has housed a vast 
num ber of souls seeking a most 
compelling harmony. The crown­
ing glory of this tangled architec­
tural assemblage is the Salle Ste. 
Cecile, a m odern, air-conditioned 
concert hall situated on the top 
floor of the most recent structure.
It possesses a good acoustics and 
can seat several hundred on its 
steeply banked terraces. The hall is 
decorated with a variety of paint­
ings by Haitian artists, and the 
school itself adorned with beauti­
fully sculpted doors and many 
large murals painted by one of its 
form er students, the sonorously 
nam ed Voltaire Romulus.
Unique and Beautiful
Within the guarded com pound 
that is the school of Ste. Trinite, a 
unique and beautiful world unfolds 
where teaching, self-discovery, the 
encounter with great music, fellow­
ship, and individual growth occur 
between regular periods allotted 
for work and play. Twice daily, at 
10:30 a.m. and 3 p.m., a bell rings 
to announce gouter. a half-hour pe­
riod where refreshm ents are served 
to all. The earlier of these two peri­
ods is the most memorable, for it is 
then that the younger members of 
Les Petits Chanteurs, fresh from 
their m orning encounter with the 
seraphic music of Mozart’s Solemn 
Vespers, break their ordered ranks 
to descend upon the food and 
drink like some vision of fallen 
angels from Paradise Lost. Their 
frantic gamboling on the concrete 
pavement ends only upon the ring­
ing of the second bell when they 
proceed to modify their hellish ulu- 
lations into songs inspiring enough 
to sustain the faithful. Such energy 
and high spirits are common at 
Ste. Trinite, where the many stu­
dent recitals are well-attended and 
encores are frequent. To make 
good music is im portant to every­
one there, but it is also very impor­
tant to have fun.
In the opinion of many, the city 
outside Ste. Trinite is in its worst
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state in more than a decade. The 
various embargoes imposed on 
Haiti, as well as its own volatile po­
litical culture, have left Port-au- 
Prince in an appalling condition: 
buildings and streets are crumbling 
with garbage left in piles every­
where and frequently set alight.
The oppressive heat of the tropical 
sun accelerates the spreading of 
the stench of garbage and hum an 
waste. The great swarms of people 
walking about appear purposeful 
and intent only upon surviving an­
other day. The few cars and trucks 
are evidence of the effectiveness of 
the fuel embargo. In fact, this em­
bargo is directly responsible for the 
camp being held in Port-au-Prince 
rather than at Leogon, many miles 
to the southeast where it is nor­
mally conducted.
An electrical generator failed 
during dinner one evening, leaving 
only a back-up that itself stopped in­
termittently, plunging the capital 
into darkness and without the 
power to pum p water. By 10 p.m. 
there was no light to be seen in the 
capital except at those points, such 
as Ste. Trinite, that were connected 
to the power line that serves the 
presidential palace. It was startling 
one evening to see the stars in such 
clear abundance as if we were stand­
ing in a country field far away rath­
er than in the center of a m odern 
national capital. Despite these ad­
versities, the pride of the ordinary 
Haitian remains strongly in evi­
dence. O ne man associated with 
the school was reproached by a 
Haitian woman who crossed the 
street to forbid his photographing 
a queue of trucks waiting for gas.
She insisted that he should not re­
cord their misery.
A World of Contrasts
The contrast between the world 
outside and inside the walls of Ste. 
Trinite was m irrored in miniature 
during the teaching of private voice 
lessons. Most often, perched on a 
third story balcony with a command­
ing view of the m ountains framing 
Port-au-Prince, the individual tenors
and basses of Les Petits Chanteurs 
would come to have their vocal 
technique and artistry scrutinized. 
Among Les Petits Chanteurs was a 
very young and exceptional student 
with the musical name of Remi. His 
voice was beautiful, but how much 
m ore so it appeared since poor 
Remi had just been released from 
the hospital where for nearly two 
weeks he had been fighting ty­
phoid fever caused by contami­
nated water.
H aiti’s turbulent 
political situation 
threatens a cornerstone 
of civil life.
The exceptionally harsh circum­
stances surrounding the lives of the 
summer camp participants do not 
appear to prevent the program 
from functioning like nearly all 
camps and summer music schools. 
The two public concerts in July, 
each three hours in length, stand 
as m onum ents to the activity of the 
school and the determ ination of its 
par-ticipants. Both concerts were 
perform ed in Salle Ste. Cecile to a 
full house and were recorded by 
Haitian television for later broadcast. 
The programs for each consisted 
of some three to five occasionally 
multimovement works by each of 
the six ensembles. Most of the selec­
tions were taken from the Western 
classical tradition such as the per­
formance of Beethoven’s Sym­
phony No. 8 by L’Orchestre 
Philharm onique Sainte Trinite.
The o ther selections were tailored 
to the technical and artistic level of 
the ensemble in question. But par­
ticularly striking was the uniquely 
Haitian classical music by the com­
posers Ferere Laguere and Lodovic 
Lamoth that appeared on both pro­
grams. The second concert was dis­
tinguished by a homage to Ferere 
Laguere (1935-85), featuring three
of his works: two orchestral, Un sel 
badjo, mi-an mi-an and Conte Haitian, 
and a song entitled “M usique” that 
reflects that aspect of French musi­
cal sensibility that is at once pas­
sionate yet restrained, combined 
with a sensuousness derived from 
the uniquely Haitian rhythms.
The intensity of the sum m er’s 
activities quickly came to an end fol­
lowing the second concert. The in­
evitable long good-byes, exchanges 
of gifts, and promises to return  next 
year were indulged as is customary 
and natural following such intense 
daily contact. A year in Haiti how­
ever, can be very long—a much 
harsher and more unpredictable 
proposition than a year experi­
enced in North America. Indeed, 
whenever discussion turned to pol­
itics and the anticipated return of 
Jean-Bertrand Aristide, a sense of 
submission to the inflexibility of 
events seemed the most common 
response of the young students. 
Haiti’s turbulent political situation 
has often threatened the school’s 
musical activities. The threat to the 
school can materially affect the 
progress of the students, who in 
the past have received many full 
scholarships from US universities. 
Apart from this, that threat seems 
to imperil the symbol of what civil 
society could be like in Haiti.
The solemn m orning ceremony 
of drapeau, where fealty to God and 
country are expressed in song and 
word, is the formal release of a vig­
orous fountain of talent and ener­
gy whose torrents daily filled every 
vessel set before it. The six hours of 
music prepared for the public con­
certs represent the students’ tre­
m endous discipline and individual 
devotion to their instruments and 
to one another; a requirem ent to 
master the demands, both intricate 
and subtle, made by the music of 
Beethoven, Mozart, and Laguere. 
The ability to work hard and to 
share generously seem to be the 
cornerstone of civil life. The ex­
tinction of this brilliant example 
would be potentially m ore harmful 
to Haiti than the loss of its one re­
maining generator. ■
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Insider briefs on people and institutions 
shaping Latin American and Caribbean affairs
Don’t Call the SS Harlan County
Women have become the newest 
targets of political violence in Haiti. 
According to a jo in t UN-OAS ob­
server mission, there has been a new 
surge of sexual assaults against fe­
male supporters of Jean-Bertrand 
Aristide, Haiti’s democratically 
elected president, who is now in 
exile in Washington. W om en’s 
groups report as many as “18 cases 
of rape in a single day,” and many 
of the “victims are market women 
who live in poor, pro-Aristide neigh­
borhoods” (The Miami Herald, April 
13, 1994).
When the Dust Settles
According to a Newsday (May 12, 
1994) analysis of Panam a’s May 
presidential election, candidate 
Ruben Blades expects to be back in 
1999. Even though the US-based ac­
tor received only 17% of the popu­
lar vote, the leader of the Papa 
Egoro Movement scared many op­
position party old-timers with his 
late spurt in popularity. The coun­
try’s new president—Ernesto Perez 
Balladares—captured 33% of the 
ballots. According to Blades, “When 
the dust settled, we were the third 
political force in the country.” The 
party also managed to capture nine 
seats in Panam a’s unicameral legis­
lative assembly.
The big question, however, is 
what happens to the actor now that 
he has lost the race? Many of his 
supporters say, “We’ll win it in ’99,” 
the year of the next election, but 
according to Newsday, Blades won’t
Edited by Mark B. Rosenberg
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commit. The best he can offer is to 
stay in Panama awhile so as “not to 
give the impression that I ’m skip­
ping town.” Besides, one report 
states he has lost as much as $150,000 
a month in revenue during the nine 
months of intense campaigning.
One Less Excuse
Brazil is now taking steps to reduce 
the cost of prophylactics, which re­
portedly “are among the most ex­
pensive in the world” (Journal of 
Commerce, April 22, 1994). The cost- 
reduction measures are tied to a 
new list of duty cuts the govern­
m ent announced in April as part of 
a Ministry of Industry, Trade, and 
Tourism effort to slash inflation. 
Currently priced at about $1 each, 
the cost of condoms will likely drop 
to about 47 cents each once the 
duty and other im port taxes are 
eliminated.
Check It Out
For those who are interested in a 
well-written and inexpensive news 
and public affairs magazine from 
Mexico, Excelsior’s Mexico Insight 
may be just the ticket. This bi-weekly, 
full-color, English-language pub­
lication is edited by Michael J. 
Zamba. In its May 1, 1994, issue, 
Mexico Insight offered thoughtful 
articles on the challenge before 
Ernesto Zedillo, the new presiden­
tial candidate of the Partido Revolu­
cionario Institutional, on the heels 
of the assassination of his prede­
cessor, Luis Donaldo Colosio.
A New OAS? A New Location?
When Joao Baena Soares steps 
down as secretary general of the 
OAS, his successor—Colombian 
president Cesar Gaviria—will con­
front challenges ranging from the 
lingering difficulties with Haiti to 
the thorny question of Cuba’s pos­
sible re-entry into the organization. 
Perhaps the most difficult, though, 
will be presented to him by com­
munity leaders in Miami, who will 
lobby heavily to relocate the OAS 
secretariat to Dade County.
A key elem ent in this lobbying 
effort will be a successful gathering 
of Latin American heads of state 
during the Summit of the Americas, 
December 9-10, 1994, in Miami. Is 
this pie-in-the-sky? Not necessarily. 
Just months before President Bill 
Clinton decided to hold the summit 
in Miami, the city was not even on 
the list of possibilities, and then was 
aggressively opposed by senior State 
Departm ent officials, among others, 
largely because of their concern 
over ethnic and exile politics there.
Arizona’s NAFTA Niche
The Arizona State Legislature ap­
proved a $100,000 grant in April 
1994 to create a com puter network 
designed to position the state as a 
regional information hub for busi­
ness trading under the auspices of 
the North American Free Trade 
Agreement. Although details are 
no t yet complete, the grant will 
underwrite an initial feasibility 
study and start-up costs for the 
network. Carol Colombo, of the 
Phoenix-based law firm of Colom­
bo & Bonacci, is one of the private- 
sector advisers to the project.
I L PMmm
Radio Marti Redux/Seeming 
(and Being) Useless
The US Inform ation Agency’s Of­
fice of Cuba Broadcasting took 
measures in March 1994 to send 
the message that it too could be 
downsized “without any negative 
impact on broadcast quality radio 
and television programs to the 
people of Cuba.” Four employees 
in the Research Analytical Unit of 
Radio Marti’s Office of Research 
were targeted. In their own defense, 
the ousted employees argued that 
“time and again, in performing 
their responsibilities, the analysts 
have sought to bring to the Radio 
Marti director’s attention real, 
underlying problems in news and 
programming, only to have the 
director respond by marginalizing 
the analytical unit, by progressively 
eliminating our functions and by 
attem pting to ultimately make us 
seem totally useless.”
When Wasn’t It?
In response to escalating violence 
directed at nationals and foreigners 
in Guatemala, one Guatemalan pri- 
vate-sector leader has observed,
“It’s like the Wild West out in the 
streets” (Business Latin America,
April 25, 1994). There have been 
few periods in the country’s con­
temporary history, however, when 
violence hasn’t been excessive and 
directed simultaneously at both rich 
and poor, the political and the apo­
litical, and national and foreign 
groups. W hat does make this epoch 
distinctive is the growing influence 
of a “powder elite” that is linked to 
narcotics trafficking.
With Friends like These . . .
In the spring of 1994 the Bolivian 
congress accused form er president 
Jaime Paz Zamora of developing a 
very close friendship with Isaac 
“Oso” Chavarria, who, according to 
the US Drug Enforcem ent Agency, 
is the country’s principal narcotics 
trafficker. In his defense, Paz Za­
mora accused the US of conspiring 
against him for inviting Fidel Cas­
tro to the August 1993 inauguration 
ceremony of President Gonzalo 
Sanchez de Lozada. The accusa­
tions against Paz Zamora and his 
party, the Movimiento de Izquierda 
Revolucionaria, have triggered Bo­
livia’s most serious political crisis 
of the 1990s, and have almost cer­
tainly derailed his re-election bid 
for 1997.
Implementing NAFTA
President Bill C linton’s February 
1994 announcem ent that the Labor 
Secretariat of NAFTA would be lo­
cated in Dallas pleased many but 
not all Texans. Some were dis­
turbed that the secretariat would 
be located at the Dallas Chamber 
of Commerce, which, after all, has 
had little or no interest in the labor 
agenda. The secretariat, to be fully 
operational by July 1994, will have 
a $3 million budget. It will enforce 
the workers’ rights side agreem ent 
to NAFTA.
In addition, Clinton will place 
the NAFTA Development Bank in 
San Antonio. The bank will under­
write NAFTA-related commerce, 
environmental, and infrastructure 
projects, with funding eventually 
reaching $3 billion. NAFTA’s Envi­
ronm ental Commission, which will
be based in Montreal, will m onitor 
environmental practices of the 
m em ber countries and review com­
plaints of unfair competition be­
cause of stricter environmental 
laws in North America.
NAFTA’s trilateral North Ameri­
can Trade Secretariat (NATS) will 
be based in Mexico City. It will be 
responsible for producing, archiv­
ing, and translating NAFTA docu­
ments. Negotiators do not agree, 
however, on NATS staffing. W here­
as the US has proposed the secre­
tariat be staffed by government 
agency officials on loan to the or­
ganization, Mexico has proposed 
that “outside personnel” be con­
tracted and paid with funds that 
are budgeted by the m em ber gov­
ernm ents for the NATS.
On the Move
Georgette Magassy Dorn has been 
nam ed as chief of the Hispanic Di­
vision of the Library of Congress. A 
specialist in Hispanic culture and 
the curator of the Archive of His­
panic Literature on Tape in the His­
panic Division, she holds a Ph.D. in 
history from Georgetown University.
Mark B. Rosenberg, founding di­
rector of the Latin American and 
Caribbean Center (LACC) at Flori­
da International University (FIU)— 
who has served in that capacity for 
17 years—has taken a leave of ab­
sence to assume the interim  dean- 
ship of FIU’s newly proposed 
College of Urban and Public Af­
fairs. Eduardo A. Gamarra, a politi­
cal scientist at FIU, is now acting 
director of LACC. He will also serve 
as editor of Hemisphere beginning 
with the next issue.
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A Sociologist Turns to Politics
by Mauricio A. Font
Brazil’s current crisis involves a diverse array of highly charged forces: economic, 
social, environmental, and—above all—political. If elected president, would 
academician Fernando Henrique Cardoso stand a chance of being effective?
“. . . [A]n ethic of ultimate 
ends and an ethic of re­
sponsibility are not abso­
lute contrasts but rather 
supplements, which only in 
unison [define] who can 
have the calling for poli­
tics. . . . Only he has the 
calling for politics who is 
sure that he shall not crum­
ble when the world from his 
point of view is too stupid 
or too base for what he 
wants to offer. ”
— Max Weber, “Politics as a Vocation ”
“As a politician, your re­
sponsibility is to change 
reality and not ju st defend 
principles. If you ’re com­
mitted to change, you can­
not turn an ethical position 
into an obstacle to action. ”
— Fernando Henrique Cardoso, The 
New York Times, March 14, 1988
W ith the May 1993 appointm ent of Fernando H enrique Cardoso as finance minister, Brazilian politics took a truly 
ironic twist. Cardoso’s criticisms of 
the 1964 authoritarian regime cost 
him his job  as a professor of soci­
ology as well as four years in exile. 
After a brilliant academic career 
that included founding depend­
ency theory, this major critic of Bra­
zil’s “associated dependen t” model 
was now given the task of solving its 
worst economic crisis since the turn 
of the century. If Cardoso succeeds, 
the country may well avert chaos 
and Cardoso could become the 
next president in 1994. High as 
the personal costs of failure may 
be, they pale in comparison to the 
highly polarized and potentially ex­
plosive presidential election that 
could result if the crisis persists or 
deteriorates further.
The Challenge
The increase in oil prices in 1973 
and 1976 and the debt crisis that 
followed in 1982 battered the Bra­
zilian economy. Gross national
Mauricio A. Font is associate professor 
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Graduate School, City University of 
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Coffee, Contention, and Change 
(Blackwell, 1990).
product per capita decreased 5% 
during the 1980s. Meanwhile, infla­
tion continued its steady climb to 
more than 30% per m onth in early
1993, signifying an annual inflation 
rate of 2,500%. In the two years pre­
ceding Cardoso’s appointm ent as 
finance minister, five predecessors 
(one of whom lasted less than three 
months) and six stabilization pro­
grams failed to bring inflation un­
der control. Cardoso’s immediate 
task was to slay, or at least slow 
down, Brazil’s galloping inflation 
by early 1994. Beyond that, he has 
to initiate or at least prepare the 
ground for some form of structural 
adjustment.
The Making of a Hero
What makes Cardoso a prince of 
hope in such a context of gloom? 
Why did the best known critic of 
the Brazilian development model 
undertake the mission of saving it?
A lifetime of intellectual, adminis­
trative, and political achievements 
explains the strength of Cardoso’s 
appeal as a hero for the times. The 
saga that would lead eventually to 
politics began when the Brazilian 
military regime forced the rising, 
left-leaning professor out of the 
Universidade de Sao Paulo and 
into four years of exile in 1964.
Taking up residence in Chile, 
Cardoso really “discovered” Latin 
America and a richer theoretical 
and comparative framework in 
which to analyze Brazil. Santiago
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GROWTH OF GDPwas perhaps the most intellectually exciting place in Latin America in 
the mid-1960s, as the left criticized 
structuralism in an atm osphere of 
optimism about the desirability and 
imminence of major social change. 
His involvement in the UN’s Eco­
nomic Commission for Latin Amer­
ica and Santiago’s universities and 
research centers led to a focused 
concerned on the question of de­
velopment, a broader Latin Ameri­
can framework, and engagem ent 
in the main currents of social dem ­
ocratic and socialist thought. Car­
doso’s collaboration with Chilean 
sociologist Enzo Faletto produced 
Dependencia y desarrollo en America 
Latina (1969; published in 1979 as 
Dependency and Development in Latin 
America by the University of Califor­
nia Press), perhaps the most influ­
ential interpretation of twentieth- 
century Ladn American structural 
dynamics. He soon em erged as the 
leading figure in Latin American 
dependency theory.
Cardoso returned to Brazil in 
late 1968, anticipating his reactiva­
tion as a professor at the Universi- 
dade de Sao Paulo, but a wave of 
repression in the following year 
“canceled” his tenured position.
In response to this setback, he es­
tablished, along with several col­
leagues, the Centro Brasileiro de 
Analise e Planejam ento (CEBRAP) 
in 1969. U nder Cardoso’s presi­
dency, CEBRAP challenged the 
stifling intellectual climate the 
military had created in Brazil.
Cardoso and his associates went 
on to play a substantial role in the 
process of gradual reopening after 
1974. A task force from CEBRAP 
played a key supporting role in the 
Movimento Democratico Brasileiro 
(MDB)—the main political organi­
zation dem anding the return of
Percentages based on values at 1980 prices
Source: UN Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean
democracy. The very objective of 
creating a space in which alterna­
tive views about Brazilian society 
could be entertained made CEBRAP 
and its president protagonists in 
that struggle, and marked CEBRAP 
for a terrorist attack. It was this strug­
gle that would eventually bring 
out in full Cardoso’s vocation as 
a politician.
Cardoso spent the 1970s making 
sense of Brazilian authoritarianism 
and exploring conceptual and theo­
retical issues raised by his brand of 
dependency theory. The most excit­
ing result of these explorations was 
his bold analysis of the relationship 
between local social classes and the 
state and the limits of the nation­
alist developm ent strategies based 
on import-substituting industriali­
zation—as well as his development 
of a conceptual framework to ex­
plain the political and economic 
dynamics of all of Latin America. 
Rather than calling for a reduc­
tionist approach to the politics of 
development, his deeper concern 
is with understanding em ergent 
social classes, political processes, 
and states through historically 
grounded research.
In 1978 Cardoso ran for the 
Brazilian senate. His victory as an 
alternate led, in 1979, to the vice­
presidency of the Partido do MDB— 
the political party that grew out of 
the MDB during Brazil’s dem ocra­
tization process. Cardoso became 
one of Sao Paulo’s regular senators 
in 1983, following Andre Franco 
M ontoro’s election as state gov­
ernor. Max W eber’s classic essay, 
“Politics as a Vocation” (quoted on 
page 20), provided the inspiration 
for his inaugural speech.
H em isphere •  W inter/Spring 1994
Features: Brazil
Cardoso’s defeat in the 1985 Sao 
Paulo mayoral race showed how 
much the neophyte had yet to learn 
in order to master politics—even if 
the loss was partly due to internal 
squabbles within the PMDB. He 
learned the lesson and in the race 
for the senate in 1986, he proved 
to be one of the biggest vote-getters. 
As the New York Times (March 14, 
1988) put it, he was “no longer 
drawn to the cloistered life of aca­
dem ia,” but had “learned to play 
politics am ong politicians.”
Politics became progressively 
more absorbing for Cardoso through­
out the 1980s. Along with many in­
tellectuals and other professionals, 
he founded in 1988 the Partido 
Social Democratico Brasileiro 
(PSDB). It was a m ore cohesive, 
principled, and manageable party 
than the PMDB, but its small size 
raised doubts about its prospects. 
Despite this, the founders forged 
ahead in articulating a progressive 
platform based on what to them 
was a realistic but socially responsi­
ble assessment of the country’s pre­
dicament, including an approach 
to economic policy that sought to 
balance state action with expanded 
roles for the market. In a political 
system that traditionally has been 
oriented to patronage and has 
tended to polarization, such a call 
to m oderation and responsibility 
could only hope to gain ground 
gradually, but the party’s reputa­
tion as a serious political organiza­
tion grew quite rapidly. Cardoso’s 
appointm ent as minister of foreign 
relations in 1992 and finance minis­
ter in 1993 reflected increased rec­
ognition of both him and the PSDB.
The Action: Content and Context
If stabilization and adjustment are 
unavoidable, Brazil is due for even 
m ore fundam ental reforms. With 
the demise of state-led import-sub­
stituting industrialization, it needs 
to find a new development strategy 
and redefine the state’s economic 
role. In immediate practical terms, 
the government must choose a 
combination of measures from a
list of such difficult instruments as 
fiscal reform, privatization, trade 
liberalization, deregulation, and 
similar “orthodox” advice—a far 
cry from the “heterodox” policy 
normally associated with the neo­
structuralism and dependency 
analysis of the 1970s.
Cardoso is one of the 
few  national political 
figures able to work 
effectively with most 
contenders in the 
Brazilian polity as 
well as with foreign 
investors and 
governments.
Critics see poetic justice in the 
unconventional Cardoso being 
compelled to follow fairly conven­
tional economic advice. But Car­
doso is no stranger to incongruities. 
To sympathizers, his keen dialecti­
cal mind will synthesize demands 
and programs into a forward-look­
ing perspective for the new century.
Cardoso’s main asset in this situ­
ation is his reputation as honest 
leader, able negotiator, and effec­
tive politician. He has already shown 
that he is one of the few national 
political figures able to work effec­
tively with most contenders in the 
Brazilian polity as well as with for­
eign investors and governments. As 
an impressive conciliator and tacti­
cian in the senate and the 1988 
constitutional assembly, he devel­
oped constructive relationships 
with entrepreneurs and trade un­
ions, political parties, and the mili­
tary. The respect he commands in
the international arena feeds the 
perception of a statesman able to 
claim for Brazil a more salient 
global role.
In the meantime, it would be 
foolish to expect Cardoso and his 
allies, or any other actor, to suc­
cessfully im plem ent all or most of 
the required reforms within a year. 
Successful structural adjustment or 
even plain stabilization normally 
takes years to carry out. In light of 
this reality, what has been achieved 
so far and what results can realisti­
cally be expected in the near future?
The initial measures imple­
m ented after June 1993 focused 
on public sector reforms aimed at 
reducing the large and growing 
government deficit of approxi­
mately $22 billion (of an $89 bil­
lion budget). Fiscal reforms in 1993 
included a budget cut of $6 billion, 
tough measures against tax evasion 
(a phenom enon that costs Brazil 
$25-30 billion per year), and call­
ing in overdue debts owed by the 
states to the central government. As 
a result, tax collection in 1993 was 
up by m ore than 25% with respect 
to the previous year and was grow­
ing at record levels in early 1994. 
These policies have brought in­
creasing macroeconomic stability— 
even if their full impact will take 
years. The projected budget for
1994 will have a significant surplus. 
Still, the economic team was frus­
trated that inflation increased from 
30% to 40% per m onth as of Janu­
ary 1994. Cardoso’s fight against 
the deficit—the main cause of in­
flation—scored another major vic­
tory in late February, when the 
congress approved a special $16 
billion fund, financed through in­
creased taxes, that theoretically en­
sures fiscal equilibrium for at least 
two years.
The fiscal measures prepared 
the ground for a stabilization pro­
gram proper—FHC2 (as dubbed 
by the m edia)—also approved in 
late February 1994. The main stabi­
lization instrum ent in FHC2 is a 
new index to be used in adjusting 
salaries and eventually most prices. 
The Unidade Real de Valor (URV)
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replaces 11 different indices cur­
rently in use. Pegged to the dollar, 
the URV is conceived as a pream ­
ble to the adoption of a strong cur­
rency—the third step in Cardoso’s 
plan. With reserves nearing $33 bil­
lion (up from $23 billion with Fer­
nando Collor de Mello) and a solid 
trade surplus, the government is in 
a very good posidon indeed to in­
troduce a stable currency.
The new fiscal context creates 
favorable conditions for speeding 
up the privatization process. Even a 
partial sale of the state’s 159 public 
enterprises worth $193 billion will 
bring considerable additional re­
sources to the treasury. The state 
has already privatized significant 
holdings in the steel industry. While 
progress in o ther sectors has been 
relatively modest as of early 1994, 
three dozen firms are being readied 
for the auction block this year, in­
cluding much of Embraer, Brazil’s 
aerospace giant. These transactions 
should bring in several billion dol­
lars. In addition, constitutional revi­
sions are being planned to further 
reduce government spending, in­
crease taxes, and allow for more 
privatization.
The reforms adopted or in prog­
ress lay the groundwork for further 
advances in the economic restruc­
turing agenda, but the bulk of 
these must be addressed by the 
government coming to office in 
January 1995. The government is 
selectively using tariff reduction as 
a disciplinary tool against sectors 
that increase prices faster than the 
URV. But major new rounds in 
trade liberalization are unlikely in 
1994. While somewhat higher than 
Latin America’s average of 11 %, 
the 14.2% m ean tariffs represent a 
considerable drop from previous 
levels and are unlikely to experi­
ence major cuts anytime soon. As 
a result, imports increased by 25% 
in 1993— to a total of $26 billion. 
Inflation will indeed need to de­
crease substantially in the near 
future for the reforms to be per­
ceived as successful, but a more 
durable solution is within reach of 
the next Brazilian government.
Cardoso’s plan picked up momen­
tum when long negotiations with 
the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) and other foreign lenders fi­
nally led to a resolution of the debt 
problem  in April 1994. The effec­
tive approval of Brazil’s stabiliza­
tion plan has put into motion an 
agreem ent to repay $49 billion of 
the foreign debt under the terms 
of the Brady plan—that is, using
US Treasury D epartm ent bonds as 
collateral—and to renegotiate the 
entire debt of $123 billion. Again, 
the macroeconomic environm ent 
created by Cardoso’s economic 
team gets much of the credit for 
solving this huge problem, and 
thus putting an end to the inter­
national debt crisis of 1982.
While the fiscal picture is greatly 
improving, the best grounds for op­
Cardoso talks to factory workers in Sao Paulo during his 1978 campaign for the Brazilian senate.
Cardoso addresses a special commission of the Brazilian senate in 1994.
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timism come from the perform ance 
of the Brazilian economy itself. At 
$446 billion, this top Latin Ameri­
can economy is larger than Russia’s. 
It grew by a healthy 5% in 1995 
and is expected to come close to 
that rate in 1994—while last year’s 
productivity grew by 6%. Having 
already withstood major forms of 
adjustment, the private sector 
rem ained remarkably resilient 
through often ill-conceived meas­
ures of past governments and re­
sponded well to the new economic 
reforms. The export sector has 
been particularly impressive and is 
responsible for a 1995 trade sur­
plus of $15 billion in the context of 
sharply increased imports. Simulta­
neously, foreign investment has 
grown substantially—from a nega­
tive $400 million in 1989 to a posi­
tive $400 in 1990, $1.1 billion in
1991, $2.9 billion in 1992, and an 
estimated $5.5 billion in 1995. A 
more stable macroeconomic envi­
ronm ent should lead to the same 
or higher levels of performance.
There is growing agreem ent in 
Brazil that the root of the country’s 
crisis has more to do with politics 
than the economy. The main ob­
stacles to reform  come from weak­
nesses in the evolving political 
system. Democratization has proven 
harder than first thought. President 
Itam ar Franco’s limited political 
base compels him to dole out pol­
icy concessions to win support. The 
fragmentation of the party system 
makes consensus extremely diffi­
cult and provides incentives for 
many of these parties to block 
reform  for narrow political and 
economic reasons. Since policy 
successes enhance the chances for 
Cardoso’s presidential bid, other 
presidential hopefuls have some­
thing to gain by blocking them in 
the congress.
The adoption of FHC2 by the 
Franco-Cardoso government has 
put Brazil on a sound track, but the 
policy and political situation re­
mains perilous. Parts of the plan 
were initiated with temporary exec­
utive decrees that still require con­
gressional approval. A most hopeful
sign is that the very long and open 
process of negotiation that Car­
doso used to arrive at his stabiliza­
tion plan has generated a broad 
and stabilizing alliance, even if the 
tem ptation to defect remains high.
Failure to reduce inflation and 
stop the crisis would most benefit 
Luiz Inacio “Lula” da Silva, the Par­
tido dos Trabalhadores candidate 
who has led in the polls for months. 
It is clear that, whatever happens, 
what the government does between 
now and October 1994 will greatly 
shape the results of the election. 
A nother big question is how much 
tolerance the military will have for 
a leftist candidate committed to a 
larger role for the state, particularly 
if there is a weakening in govern- 
ability as the elections approach. 
Last year there were clear rum ­
blings of military anxiety over cor­
ruption and incoherence in the 
congress and the prospects of a 
deepening political crisis. Since a 
candidate of the right seems objec­
tionable to many Brazilians, the 
very danger in the situation may in 
the end favor a center-left m oder­
ate candidate such as Cardoso.
The Journey Ahead
Predicting Brazilian politics is a 
risky business, but it is difficult to 
foresee democratization in Brazil 
without the PSDB and Cardoso as 
major players. If the current re­
forms and policy team organized
There is growing 
agreement in Brazil 
that the root of the 
country’s crisis has 
more to do with 
politics than the 
economy.
by Cardoso survive through 1994, it 
will likely lead to an enhanced po­
litical role for both regardless of 
the outcome of the October elec­
tions. The PSDB and Cardoso will 
thus emerge as significant winners 
from this situation—even if a dra­
matic turnaround in the rate of 
inflation does not materialize. On 
the o ther hand, a major deteriora­
tion of economic or political con­
ditions, coupled with any large 
miscalculation by other players, 
could still bring the country close 
to chaos. The passage between the 
Charybdis of ineffectiveness and 
the Scylla of turbulence is in fact 
populated by hungry sharks, but 
this situation only focuses more 
sharply the attention on the skills 
and nerve of the one at the helm, 
enhancing the dramatic quality of 
the performance.
Will the stars that have guided 
Cardoso this far continue to shine? 
Probably, though clouds on the po­
litical horizon will make them  hard 
to see at times. If so, Cardoso’s stint 
as finance minister will indeed have 
opened a new and major chapter 
in the drawn out process of Brazil­
ian democratization and economic 
reform. The expectation that this 
is the last chapter should be tem­
pered by signs that the book is far 
from complete. The difficulty in 
obtaining short-term success pales 
in comparison to the larger eco­
nomic and political challenges 
ahead—stabilization, structural 
adjustment, and the formation of 
a durable coalition around a new 
development strategy. A good per­
formance against inflation and in 
political stabilization will earn Car­
doso and his party a cardinal posi­
tion from which to negotiate with 
o ther contenders the adoption of 
effective answers to pressing long­
term problems. But the ultimate 
answer is necessarily a collective 
one. What will m atter in the end is 
the political maturity of institutions, 
political organizations, and the gen­
eral public. Therefore, what the 
current situation puts to an exact­
ing test is the process of Brazilian 
democratization itself. ■
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Crisis and Environment
by J. Timmons Roberts
During the 1982 UN Envi­ronm ent Conference, Brazil was called “the world’s worst polluter.” Moreover, reports of pol­lution and deforestation 
in the Amazon worsened through­
out the decade. In 1989, when a 
US congressional delegation of­
fered to help generate resources for 
the environmental protection of 
the Amazon, President Jose Sarney 
responded, “We d on’t want the 
Amazon to become a green Persian 
Gulf.” By 1992, however, Brazil was 
playing host to the massive UN Con­
ference on Environment and Devel­
opm ent, and Sarney’s successor, 
Fernando Collor de Mello, signed 
all the proposed conventions. Some 
of these—on climate change and 
biodiversity, and the declaration of 
principles on forests—could poten­
tially limit Brazil’s economic growth 
rate. Thus, the event appeared to 
signal an im portant reversal of pol­
icy for a country that had long re­
jected  outside pressures to protect 
its environment.
Satellite photographs of the 
Amazon reveal that the current 
rate of deforestation is down dra­
matically from that of the 1980s. Es­
timates of how m uch deforestation 
occurred during the 1980s are still 
contested, from NASA’s 15,000 
square kilometers per year to the 
World Resources Institute’s 80,000. 
The latest NASA figures, however, 
are down sharply from either fig­
ure: satellite photographs from 1991
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show the rate at around 10,900 
square kilometers. The figures for 
1989 and 1990 were also lower than 
for previous years. The diminished 
rate of deforestation, which began 
in 1988, has led observers to ques­
tion whether the drop is truly the 
result of successful environmental 
policies and enforcement, or m ere­
ly a product of wet burning seasons 
and the country’s devastating eco­
nomic crisis.
To head off 
international avarice, 
Brazil’s military 
pushed for rapid 
occupation by 
Brazilians of what it 
saw as “empty spaces. ” 
Yet the projects 
boomeranged.
Has Brazil truly turned environ­
mentalist? Why did Brazil’s state 
leadership feel it had to undertake 
a long and expensive international 
political campaign to “green” the 
country’s image? Are Brazil’s eco­
nomic and political crises condu­
cive to environmental protection? 
Which major players support or 
oppose protectionist measures? Is 
a national consensus on environ­
mental policy in the making?
The Problems
Brazil suffers from a series of dire 
environmental problems. For ex­
ample, the species-diverse Atlantic 
Coast forest—which in colonial 
times stretched virtually unbroken 
from the country’s northeast to its 
south—is now reported to be more 
than 90% decimated, with its rem ­
nants still threatened. More than 
70% of Brazilians have no sewage 
treatm ent (a situation underscored 
by Brazil’s recent cholera epidemic), 
a problem  reaching from far rural 
isolation into the heart of Brazil’s 
most m odern cities: industrialized 
Sao Paulo, with a population of 
more than 15 million residents and 
accounting for almost a quarter of 
Brazil’s entire gross national prod­
uct, lacks sewage treatm ent for more 
than 80% of its population. Air pol­
lution and illegal toxic dum ping are 
also widespread problems.
Most international concern, 
though, has centered on the de­
struction of the earth ’s largest and 
oldest block of tropical rain forest: 
the Amazon, two-thirds of which 
lies within Brazil’s boundaries. Be­
cause the Amazon region makes up 
m ore than half of Brazil’s national 
territory, economic planners have 
been encouraging its rapid devel­
opm ent since the 1950s. With the 
discovery of impressive mineral 
resources there, Brazil’s post-1964 
military regime became concerned 
with international avarice toward 
the Amazon. To head off a feared 
“invasion,” the military pushed for 
rapid occupation by Brazilians of 
what it saw as “empty spaces.” This 
emptiness was a misconception, 
however. For centuries the Ama­
zonian economy experienced wild 
booms and busts involving the ex­
traction of various commodities
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(medicinal plants, cacao, rubber, 
and Brazil nu ts), which had already 
introduced a population of Brazil 
nu t and rubber gatherers, small 
farmers, lumberers, traders, and 
strong local commercial and politi­
cal elites, in addition to the indige­
nous peoples already there.
To quicken the pace of develop­
ment, Brazil’s federal government 
built a series of roads into the Ama­
zon, earm arked 3% of all national 
revenues for a special development 
agency for the region, and provided 
a series of generous incentives to 
businesses setting up operations 
there. Mining, lumbering, agricul­
ture, and ranching—m uch of which 
was owned and operated by out­
siders to the region—took off in the 
1960s and 1970s. In agitating for 
the development of the Amazon, 
Brazil’s military had the strong sup­
port of some of the nation’s largest 
corporations, especially those in 
construction. Four of the country’s 
10 largest private firms are builders, 
and were am ong the main benefi­
ciaries of enorm ous contracts to 
build road, dam, and m ining proj­
ects in the region.
Many of these ambitious projects 
were financed through external 
loans, including several provided 
or guaranteed by the World Bank. 
Some were undertaken specifically 
to provide exports that would im­
prove Brazil’s debt profile with ex­
ternal lenders. Yet a num ber of 
these projects later boomeranged. 
For example, the plan to turn the 
Carajas iron deposits into an ex- 
port-based, regional development 
project for the eastern Amazon 
(funded partially by the World 
Bank in addition to o ther external 
sources) would have required 22 
massive pig-iron factories fueled by 
charcoal from the native rain forest. 
Based on projections of the defores­
tation this was expected to cause, 
international environmentalists at­
tacked the Carajas project as, po­
tentially, one of the world’s five 
worst environmental disasters. On 
the o ther side of the Amazon re­
gion, a photograph taken during 
the 1987 dry season from a US
space shuttle showed m ore than
5,000 fires. That photo covered an 
area of the state of Rondonia where 
the huge Polonoroeste colonization 
project—funded by the World Bank 
and the Inter-American Develop­
m ent Bank—was under way.
Environmentalists 
decried Brazil’s 
policies, while the fa r  
right claimed outside 
pressure was a plot 
to keep the country 
underdeveloped.
European and US environm en­
talists vilified Brazil for its environ­
m ental and Amazonian policies, 
bringing substantial pressure to 
bear through agencies such as the 
World Bank and the Inter-American 
Development Bank, the interna­
tional press, the US Congress, and 
the European Community. Further, 
where local environmental groups 
appeared weak, the international 
environmentalists worked through 
or even created their own chapters 
in Brazil. Contacts between interna­
tional environmentalists and leaders 
of Brazilian grassroots organiza­
tions of rubber tappers, Indians, 
small farmers, urban environm en­
talists, and others have multiplied 
rapidly since the mid-1980s.
For a long time the military and 
the far right in Brazil have claimed 
that such outside pressure was part 
of a plot to keep Brazil from becom­
ing a developed country. Speaking 
to a m eeting of the Amazon Basin’s 
nine nations in 1989, for instance, 
senior Brazilian diplomat Paulo Fle- 
cha de Lima described accusations 
about Brazil’s poor environmental
record as part of “a campaign to 
impede exploitation of natural re­
sources in order to block [Brazil] 
from becoming a world power” (O 
Liberal, Belem, November 14, 1989).
New Alignments
Since the democratic opening in 
1985, however, Brazilian politicians 
have increasingly been aware of the 
environm ent’s im portance in for­
eign relations. In that same year the 
World Bank suspended payments 
on the Polonoroeste program and 
the first national meeting of rubber 
tappers was held in Brasilia. The 
December 1988 m urder of Chico 
Mendes—the internationally known 
leader of the rubber-tappers union 
in the Amazon state of Acre—in­
tensified pressures on Brazil to ad­
dress the problems of deforestation 
and hum an rights abuses in the 
Amazon.
In 1988, President Sarney, de­
spite his sometimes anti-environ- 
mentalist stance, pushed through 
the country’s first comprehensive 
environmental policy, “Nossa Natu- 
reza,” which am ong other things 
created the Instituto Brasileiro do 
Meio Ambiente e dos Recursos 
Naturais Renovaveis (IBAMA). 
Though riddled with problems, 
IBAMA and other government 
organs have exercised growing 
strength in pressing for increased 
environmental safeguards. Sarney 
later campaigned successfully for 
Brazil to host the 1992 UN Confer­
ence on Environment and Devel­
opm ent (UNCED).
Just before his inauguration in
1990, a trip by president-elect Fer­
nando Collor de Mello to the US, 
Europe, Russia, and Japan made 
him acutely aware of the strategic 
role of environmental issues in for­
eign affairs. After announcing a 
rather ambitious environmental 
program, Collor canceled the re­
maining fiscal incentives for land 
clearing in the Amazon during his 
first day in office. He also appointed 
as minister of the environm ent the 
vocal environmentalist Jose Lutzen- 
burger (who later resigned after
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many disagreements) and changed 
IBAMA from a regulatory to an 
executive body. With the change, 
the minister of the environm ent 
advised the presidency directly, 
though m uch power was vested in 
the Conselho da Republica, where 
a strong military presence remained. 
Due to the economic crisis, the 
potential for reducing the govern­
m ent’s budget made cutting sub­
sidies for ranching and lumbering 
a relatively easy decision. Still, as 
US political scientist Steven San­
derson points out, “Collor d idn’t 
disconnect the environmental im­
perative from the National Security 
Council.”
An undeniable feature of 
UNCED—which took place as 
Collor fell into a devastating cor­
ruption scandal—was the massive 
presence of nongovernmental or­
ganizations (NGOs) at official and 
nonofficial events. Networking be­
tween environmental, wom en’s, in­
digenous, and other groups from 
around the globe took off in Rio, 
a change that appears irreversible. 
Within Brazil, environmental NGOs 
have grown from about 40 groups 
in 1980 to more than 2,000 in
1992. The advocacy and research 
groups—which are well connected 
with universities, government agen­
cies, policy circles, and internation­
al financial sources—are gaining 
political power. According to Bra­
zilian analyst Eduardo J. Viola, a 
class of highly educated technicians 
and administrators is heading the 
organizations, making the movement 
increasingly more professional.
Environmental groups in Brazil 
vary widely in terms of whether 
their structure is basically top-down 
or grassroots in nature, the class ori­
gins of their members and the par­
ticular issues that concern them, 
and their styles of action. Most of 
the country’s environmental groups, 
however, face a critical problem: 
Brazil, like most of Latin America, 
lacks a tradition of mem bership in 
civic organizations. Thus, accord­
ing to Flavio de Mattos Franco of 
the World Wildlife Fund in Bra­
silia, Brazil’s largest group, S.O.S.
Mata Atlantica, has only 2,000 
members even after a national 
m embership campaign. The Bra­
zilian chapter of the World Wildlife 
Fund has virtually no dues-paying 
members. Consequently, these and 
most o ther NGOs are forced to look 
for o ther sources of funding, pri­
marily from international groups, 
corporate sponsors, or government 
contracts, thereby potentially com­
promising their independence.
Environmentally 
protected areas, which 
encompass ju st 3.5%  
of Brazilian territory, 
are chronically 
threatened by invading 
gold miners, lumberers, 
and squatters.
Recent interviews with several 
Brazilian environmentalists reflect 
their uncertainty about the direc­
tion of the ecology movement. Soci­
ologist Arturo Deiges noted that in 
national contests of polarizing poli­
tics, groups concerned solely with 
environmental affairs have been 
confronted by other groups push­
ing for social and political justice. 
While the umbrella organization 
for environmental groups at the 
1992 UNCED debated w hether to 
exclude social justice groups from 
their tent, Beth Grimberg, of the 
organization Polis in Sao Paulo, 
and Mattos express the belief that 
social justice and environmental 
groups are converging politically, a 
process that seems to have begun in 
the mid-1980s. Donald Sawyer, of 
the Brasilia-based NGO Instituto de 
Sociedade, Popula^ao e Natureza, 
asserts that even mainstream envi­
ronm ental groups in the US now 
realize the need to combine social 
justice and environmental goals in 
funding projects in Brazil.
A nother key result of the 1992 
UNCED were the promises of 
more than $5 billion in aid and 
loans for environmental programs 
in Brazil and other Third World na­
tions. Such funding does not come 
without conditions, though, and 
Brazil’s environmental policy con­
tinues to be somewhat driven by 
pressure from the World Bank and 
other outside lenders. For example, 
some new programs require that 
Brazil im plem ent the legislation 
and enforcem ent necessary before 
the promised funding is released. 
Joao Paulo Capobianco, head of the 
lead environmental group S.O.S. 
Mata Atlantica, warns, “If a radical 
change does not occur in the pos­
ture of the government, of politi­
cians, and the press,” UNCED’s 
achievements, including loans and 
foreign aid, could be lost (Folha de 
Sao Paulo, June 22, 1993).
According to Deiges, Brazil uses 
three main policy instruments to 
address the Amazon question: pro­
tected areas, environmental impact 
analysis, and spatial planning. Pro­
tected areas, which encompass just 
3.5% of Brazilian territory, are 
chronically threatened by invading 
gold miners, lumberers, and squat­
ters. These preserves are poorly 
dem arcated and will become mere 
islands if current trends continue: 
there is growing understanding 
that, rather than attem pting to 
transplant the European and US 
conceptions of pristine wilderness, 
a model of sustainable use would 
be more effective in the Amazon. 
Yet another problem  is that, while 
Brazil formally adopted environ­
mental impact analysis in 1986, the 
projects with the greatest potential 
for environmental destruction are 
directed by the government, which 
exempts itself from preparing im­
pact statements. Finally, spatial 
planning (i.e. zoning) has been 
repeatedly proposed over the last
10 years, but has been notably inef­
fective since Brazil lacks the infra­
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structure and the political will to 
enforce such measures in the face 
of desperate poverty, political pa­
tronage, and corruption.
What Has Changed?
Has the tone of environmental de­
bates changed within Brazil? Ac­
cording to Jean Hebette, of the 
Centro Agrario do Tocantins in the 
Amazon state of Para, the NGOs 
have been highly influential: “The 
debate has changed from finding 
fault to looking for solutions. Colo­
nists are talking about preserving 
their resources. Rubber tappers are 
now talking more about sustainable 
development. The international 
ecological movement was critical in 
affecting the [public’s] mentality 
through the media. But their ideas 
fell on good soil with the small pro­
ducers.” The old right and the 
army, however, have increasingly 
expressed the nationalistic view 
that environmentalists are inspired 
by outsiders who are threatening 
Brazil’s sovereignty.
Public opinion seems to be 
“greening” in Brazil, but it remains 
unclear whether such concern will 
translate into action and whether 
it will last long now that the ex­
citem ent of the 1992 UNCED has 
faded. On the positive side, 50% of 
respondents in a 1992 Gallup sur­
vey in Brazil rated environmental 
issues as “very serious,” and when 
asked how concerned they were 
about environmental problems,
80% said “a great deal” or “a fair 
am ount.” Even more convincingly, 
Brazil was am ong the highest of 
the 24 countries studied in the 
portion of the population (71%) 
agreeing that “protecting the envi­
ronm ent should be given priority, 
even at the risk of slowing down 
economic growth.” Brazilians, 
though, ranked lowest in the world 
(26%) in the rate of “green con­
sumerism,” that is, avoiding certain 
products that harm  the environ­
ment. The same poll, designed by 
US sociologist Riley E. Dunlap, 
shows that economic and social 
issues are m ore pressing for Bra­
zilians: only 2% considered envi­
ronm ental problems as the most 
im portant in the nation.
US political scientist Timothy J. 
Power observes that, in spite of the 
importance of public opinion and 
interest groups in setting environ­
mental policy, the leadership role 
of the president remains pivotal. As 
a weak president with no m andate, 
Sarney’s periodic anti-environmen­
tal outbursts appear to have been 
largely for domestic political con­
sumption, as he needed military 
support to serve out the rem ainder 
of his term. Unlike Sarney, Collor 
had 33 million votes, and thus had 
more leeway to maneuver against 
the military, at least early in his 
aborted term.
Public opinion seems to 
be “greening” in Brazil. 
It remains unclear, 
though, whether such 
concern will translate 
into action and whether 
it will endure beyond 
the excitement of the
1992 UN Conference 
on Environment and 
Development
With the im peachm ent and 
resignation of Collor in 1992 and 
the succession of his vice president 
Itam ar Franco to the presidency, 
Brazil has returned to a lame duck, 
unelected president with sinking 
popularity and marginal room  to 
set his own agenda. Faced with the 
constant dem ands of what seem 
like perpetual economic and polit­
ical crises, Franco has decidedly 
soft-pedaled environmental issues.
While he formed the Ministerio 
Extraordinario para a Amazonia 
and chose a form er ambassador to 
the US—Rubens Ricupero—to 
head it, giving Ricupero and his 
new ministry a high-profile loca­
tion in his old, and now vacant, 
vice-presidential suite in the presi­
dential palace, it remains unclear 
what the role of this new ministry 
will be. Ricupero stepped down 
from his post in March 1994 to as­
sume the powerful position of eco­
nomic minister. He was replaced in 
April by Henrique Brandao Caval­
canti, who promised to “not change 
anything in environmental policy.” 
An indicator of Franco’s weak com­
m itm ent to environmental conser­
vation in the Amazon is that he has 
largely sought to avoid dealing with 
the controversy raised in the after- 
math of the mid-1993 massacre of 
Yanomami Indians by Brazilian 
gold miners. Franco even lashed 
out against officials who did not 
defend Brazil’s official position on 
the matter.
So, is Brazil’s economic and 
political crisis conducive or not to 
environmental protection? On the 
one hand, the weakness of the na­
tional treasury makes the govern­
m ent more attentive to the need to 
create a positive image of the coun­
try in the outside world. On the 
o ther hand, the ravages of the eco­
nomic crisis continue to drive poor 
people to the Amazon in search of 
gold and land, making enforcement 
of environmental regulations and 
protecting reserve boundaries in­
creasingly difficult. The political cri­
sis—which sometimes appears to 
approach the collapse of the Bra­
zilian state—underm ines respect 
for the rule of law and confidence 
in environmental protection organs 
such as IBAMA. Finally, in times of 
desperate hardship, such agencies 
seem increasingly alien and irrele­
vant to the many people for whom 
short-term thinking takes prece­
dence over sustainable development.
The current crisis, then, has 
created some factors favoring both 
more and less attention to Brazil’s 
environment. Continuing swings in
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policy and posture are likely. When 
the president needs international 
legitimacy, a large-scale project to 
gain international media attention 
is launched. Such projects are set 
up “for the English to see” (as the 
Brazilian saying goes), while the 
root problems go unaddressed.
The basic problems—poverty, cor­
ruption, and violence, as well as 
inequalities of land tenure and 
wealth that rank among the world’s 
worst—continue to drive the poor 
into the Amazon and to create an 
atm osphere of impunity for both 
those who violate hum an rights and 
damage the natural environment.
Was Collor merely an exception, 
or could Brazil’s next president, to 
be elected in November 1994, sig­
nificantly alter the country’s ap­
proach to environmental questions? 
Leading in the polls for the presi­
dential election is Luiz Inacio 
“Lula” da Silva, the candidate of 
the Partido dos Trabalhadores and 
an ex-steelworker from Sao Paulo. 
During his 1989 campaign Lula or­
ganized large committees of aca­
demics, environmentalists, and 
policy experts to develop a new en­
vironmental policy. The structure 
of power that might emerge from a 
Lula victory would likely spell a new 
level and type of participation by 
environmental and social NGOs in 
setting their country’s policy. The 
implications for the environm ent 
of a victory by his main rival, Fer­
nando H enrique Cardoso, are un­
clear. We have seen how many of 
the major players in the environ­
m ental struggle continue to face 
each other: NGOs, the military, 
foreign lenders, business interests, 
and so on. Regardless of the elec­
tion’s results, changes in public 
opinion and the growth of the 
social justice and environmental 
NGOs are bound to have lasting 
effects on environmental policy in 
Brazil. While addressing environ­
m ental issues remains difficult 
given the ongoing economic and 
political crises, environmental 
NGOs and international lenders 
will make it impossible for Brazil’s 
new president to ignore them. ■
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Monetary “Lobotomy” and Inflation
by Katherine Ellison
Most Brazilians dream  o f a future in which they could make reg­ular bank deposits, knowing that by a certain time they will 
have saved enough for a down pay­
m ent on a car or home. It seems a 
simple fantasy for members of the 
world’s tenth largest economy, 
whose gross domestic product grew 
in 1993 by nearly 5%. Yet ever since 
inflation rocketed from 45% a year 
in 1976 to a record 2,567% in 1993, 
the notion has grown more and 
m ore outlandish.
This is no t to say that Brazil’s 
inflation—now at 40-plus percent 
a m onth, one of the worst rates in 
the world—has not had some fans. 
Banks, for instance, have made bil­
lions from the price increases every 
year. Speculators have also profited 
from what is, in effect, a tax paid by 
the poor, who have no hope of sav­
ing, to the rich. But now, the class 
of those with the savvy, surplus 
cash, and sufficient lack of scruples 
to profit from the economic chaos 
is shrinking. Meanwhile, elections 
planned for October 1994 are in­
creasing pressure on the govern­
m ent to take dramatic action.
On March 1, then-finance minis­
ter Fernando Henrique Cardoso 
vowed he would m eet the challenge, 
as he launched the tenth major 
anti-inflation campaign since 1980. 
Within the same m onth, Cardoso 
quit the ministry to run for presi­
dent. But his plan is still alive and, 
despite huge obstacles, still being 
viewed as Brazil’s best chance for 
economic stability.
Katherine Ellison is the Miami Herald ’v 
South America bureau chief in Rio de 
Janeiro.
The keystone of the crusade is 
a bold attem pt to “dollarize” the 
economy, although no one in the 
government is eager to use that 
word. What this means is that the 
nation’s all-but-useless currency, 
the cruzeiro real, is to be converted 
back into a genuine unit of wealth. 
The process has begun with the in­
troduction of the Unidade Real de 
Valor (URV), a dollar-based index 
now being used to establish the val­
ues of salaries and other im portant 
contracts. On July 1, according to 
the plan, the URV itself will become 
a new currency—the sixth new cur­
rency in the past 14 years. It is to 
be called the “real,” and worth 
roughly a dollar.
I.............................................. ...—
I The joke spread that 
the monetary reform 
was the government’s 
way of saying,
Together, we will 
rob you. ”
Economist Winston Fritsch, one 
of Cardoso’s principal advisers at 
the finance ministry, calls the proc­
ess a kind of “lobotomy” necessary 
to cure Brazilians of their inflation­
ary expectations. “Money in Brazil 
has ceased to be a unit of account 
or store of value,” he said. “So now
we are creating a currency in steps 
to recreate in the population the 
notion of a currency that has real 
value.” Government leaflets market­
ing the plan have pressed this psy­
chological approach. “Finally, a 
new currency, strong and as re­
spected—here and abroad—as 
Brazil deserves,” the leaflets prom ­
ised. “A real currency, to fill people 
with pride.”
Justifiably hardened by their his­
tory of disappointments, however, 
Brazilians have been slow to jum p 
on the bandwagon. In the week in 
which Cardoso launched his plan, 
the joke spread that URV was the 
governm ent’s way of saying, “ Uni- 
dos roubaremos voces" (“Together, we 
will rob you.”).
Such cynicism has threatened to 
strangle Cardoso’s project in its in­
fancy, as does what some politicians 
view as its fatal flaw: i.e., while it 
puts a lid on salaries, it gives no 
guarantee that prices won’t keep 
shooting up. In early March, after 
hearing the details of Cardoso’s 
strategy, union leaders threatened 
strikes and leftist politicians de­
m anded that the government re­
treat from what they charged was a 
shock plan that placed all of the 
burden of reform on workers’ 
shoulders. Part of the unions’ fear 
had already been realized in Feb­
ruary when sellers, perhaps in an­
ticipation of a price freeze, raised 
the cost of basic foodstuffs by 53%, 
well above the predicted 38% infla­
tion for that m onth. The price of 
beans, a Brazilian staple, rocketed 
up by 179%, according to the news 
magazine Veja, while the price of 
onions soared by 126%.
Cardoso vowed that he would 
not freeze prices, a tactic that has 
failed in the past. Yet his advisers 
insisted they could bully suppliers
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away from abusing strapped con­
sumers. In what Fritsch called 
“m oral suasion” and some news­
papers have dubbed “fiscal ter­
rorism,” Fritsch said the finance 
ministry could, if necessary, cut tar­
iffs on exports by unruly firms, or 
reduce subsidies. “Every company 
has some dealings with the govern­
ment, so you can always find some 
way to harass them ,” he said.
Cardoso had been preparing 
the ground for the URV for months 
before he pu t it into practice, most­
ly by raising taxes and designing 
deep cuts in the federal budget. 
With a balanced budget, the gov­
ernm ent would no longer be forced 
to print money to cover its debts, 
thus fueling inflation. N onethe­
less—and this is the p lan’s most 
serious problem —the ex-minister’s 
budget has yet to be approved by 
the congress, which is bogged down 
by election-year intrigues and a 
long-running investigation into a 
massive corruption scandal of its 
members.
More bad news came in April, 
when legislators acknowledged 
they had at least temporarily aban­
doned a long-awaited and urgently 
needed constitutional revision. Car­
doso had hoped to steer the proc­
ess toward supporting his plan, by 
means of approval of changes in 
the tax laws, an overhaul of the 
bankrupt social security system, and 
the reversal of a law that bans the 
firing of public employees. Now all 
these measures will have to wait.
This opposition leaves Cardoso 
with perhaps one last weapon with 
which to coax support for his pro­
posal from the ruling elite. Many 
believe that if nothing is done soon 
about the rampaging inflation, Bra­
zil’s poor majority will give an over­
whelming victory in October to 
Cardoso’s main rival, the socialist 
labor leader Luiz Inacio “Lula” da 
Silva, already by far the current 
front-runner in all public opinion 
polls. The increasing fear of a Lula 
victory may have become the best 
hope that Brazil’s aristocracy will at 
last unite behind a stabilization 
plan. ■
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Features: Mexico
Chiapas and the National Crisis
by Jorge Castaneda
The Chiapas rebellion reflects a profound national crisis in Mexico. It reflects 
a Mexico that, despite its deepening integration with the US, remains firmly 
anchored in the Third World
W ith the outcry of “no que no, hijos de la chingada," the feared Mexican bronco awoke from his leth­argy and submission 
in the remote highlands of Chia­
pas—the land of indigenous peo­
ple and anthropologists, of huipiles 
and syncretism. The em ergence of 
a Mexican guerrilla movement has 
unleashed a political crisis for the 
country, an image crisis outside of 
Mexico and—the only positive re­
sult imaginable—a crisis of con­
science am ong a Mexican elite 
separated by an abyss of centuries 
from the indigenous masses that 
have taken up arms.
Lacking better information on 
what the final outcom e will be— 
though no doubt tragic—and ex­
amining the insurrection with the 
caution that is necessary for any 
event of this type in Mexico, four 
reflections come to mind. The first 
has to do with the nature and struc­
ture of the guerrilla force itself. In 
contrast to the 1970s campesino up­
risings in the state of Guerrero, the 
Chiapas rebels are genuine guerril­
las and not simply one more group 
of angry and insurrectionist peasants.
Jorge Castaneda is the author of Uto­
pia Unarmed: The Future of the 
Latin American Left (New York: 
Knopf 1993).
Although not all the members 
of the Ejercito Zapatista de Libera­
tion  National (EZLN) carry the 
powerful m odern weapons of its 
television spokespersons, several 
thousand combatants form part of 
a defined and coordinated struc­
ture guided by a single leadership 
with a politically consistent, albeit 
archaic, discourse. The Zapatistas’ 
organizational, logistical, public re­
lations, and communications capac­
ity and their tactical and military 
strategy reveal that this group has 
been preparing itself for years.
They have well-trained units and 
qualified instructors. This is not a 
millenarian Jacquerie; it is a highly 
current and contemporary guer­
rilla group.
The Chiapas rebels 
are genuine guerrillas, 
not simply one more 
group of angry 
and insurrectionist 
peasants.
Second, the EZLN’s em ergence 
in itself denotes either a functional 
failure or an incomprehensible 
mystery for the Mexican state ap­
paratus. Almost three years ago, 
rum ors of a guerrilla uprising in
Chiapas abounded. In July and 
August of 1993 the newspaper La 
Jornada and the magazine Proceso 
published long articles regarding 
battles in the Lacandona Jungle 
and the town of Ocosingo. Carlos 
Montemayor—the well-known 
Mexican writer and an authority 
on arm ed insurrections in Mex­
ico— stated that “in those regions, 
the m ountains have eyes.” Every­
thing is known, and the Mexican in­
telligence services—no m atter how 
corrupt or repressive—have a well- 
deserved reputation for efficiency 
and quickness. W hen they want to 
capture someone, discover some­
thing, or infiltrate and disarticulate 
a group, they do it well.
Sophisticated Warriors
No one understands how thousands 
of chiapaneco campesinos, led by in­
digenous and mestizo leaders from 
both that region and the rest of the 
country, were able to train and pre­
pare for a complex and trem en­
dously ambitious operation without 
raising any suspicions. This is even 
less comprehensible if one remem ­
bers that the current secretary of 
the interior and the man responsi­
ble for the security of the Mexican 
state, Patrocinio Gonzalez Garrido, 
served as governor of Chiapas until 
the beginning of 1993; in reality he 
has also retained political control 
over his hom e state. A grave defi­
ciency exists in the government of
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Carlos Salinas de Gortari that re­
veals either an unconscious calcu­
lation that purposely allowed the 
eruption to achieve a specific politi­
cal objective or an acute state of in­
ternal decomposition.
Third, the Chiapas revolt sup­
ports the argum ent of those ob­
stinate and maligned critics and 
skeptics who, since 1988, have in­
sisted that the route taken by the 
Salinas government would lead, 
sooner or later, to a major crisis. 
Such a crisis, they noted, would 
occur, not in a country magically 
propelled to the First World by 
news media headlines and elite 
trade agreements, but one firmly 
anchored in the perm anent Third 
World within Mexico—that part of 
the country that includes several 
segregated nations, injustice and 
inequality, authoritarianism and 
corruption, and poverty and mar­
ginalization.
Deeper Crisis
The Chiapas uprising is a symbol of 
a much deeper crisis. It is neither an 
exclusively ethnic phenom enon nor 
the product of the undeniable pov­
erty and backwardness of the state 
of Chiapas. While Chiapas is one of 
the most backward states in Mex­
ico, it is also one of the four states 
where the government has concen­
trated its efforts and resources to 
fight poverty through its so-called 
National Solidarity Program.
What gave rise to the guerrillas 
in Chiapas was not only its back­
wardness and the marginality and 
isolation of its indigenous popu­
lation but, above all, a political 
problem. In Chiapas the Salinas 
government spent money, but the 
corrupt, oligarchic, and authoritar­
ian social and political structures 
were m aintained and strengthened. 
State authorities and the army itself 
encouraged cattle ranchers to seize 
land from the communities. The 
security forces and, again, the army 
repressed the indigenous peoples 
without mercy: they violated hum an 
rights, raped women, jailed leaders 
and priests, burned towns and vil­
lages, and left legitimate ancestral 
claims dangling. The typically eco­
nomic and despotic conception of 
the Salinas government resulted in 
a policy that was doom ed to fail. 
The chiapanecos, like millions of 
o ther Mexicans, want more than a 
trickle of money—they want real re­
sources. They also want to partici­
pate in deciding how, by whom, and 
where money will be spent. Above 
all, they want to be treated with dig­
nity, not humiliated, beaten, and 
repressed.
Mexico cannot 
continue to be 
governed the way 
it has been so far. 
The appearance of a 
guerrilla force means 
that some Mexicans 
do not have faith  in 
elections.
The fourth and final reflection is 
that Mexico cannot continue to be 
governed the way it has been so 
far. The problem  of Chiapas is 
Mexico; it is not social or economic, 
but political. The appearance of a 
guerrilla force—no m atter how 
ephem eral it may prove to be— 
means that there are Mexicans who 
do not believe in the electoral route 
to channel their demands. This was 
already well known. Poll after poll 
revealed that more than half of all 
voters do not believe in the trans­
parency of the electoral processes. 
The Salinas government dedicated 
five years, millions of dollars, thou­
sands of liters of ink, and an infinite 
num ber of international friend­
ships to destroying Cardenismo, 
the only opposition force that 
could have electorally channeled 
the dem ands and discontent of
groups such as the ones in Chiapas. 
Cardenismo was accused of radi­
calism, extremism, violence, and 
anachronism, in the forlorn hope 
that 90 million Mexicans would be 
convinced or compelled to fit with­
in the confines of a country seem­
ingly composed of nothing but 
magnates and “yuppies” of the Par­
tido Revolucionario Institucional, 
and Creole lawyers and middle- 
class supporters of the Partido de 
Accion Nacional. Cuauhtemoc 
Cardenas appeared as an evil to be 
avoided at all costs—including de­
mocracy, hum an rights, and inter­
national image.
Several Evils
It is clear today, as many originally 
thought, that Cardenas is the lesser 
of several evils. The real evils—vio­
lence, desperation, impotence, and 
rage—are on Guerrero M ountain 
in Chiapas, in the barrios of Netza- 
hualcoyotl, or in the barrancas of 
Tijuana. The one overwhelming 
evil is the irrational and condem- 
nable recourse to arms and the re­
jection of legality and the electoral 
route. The new configuration of 
the Mexican political spectrum 
that will emerge from Chiapas is 
loyal to the real country. If the eter­
nally postponed Mexican dem ocra­
tization can occur, the indigenous 
ire of Chiapas and other rages and 
resentments lodged within the end- 
of-century Mexican mestizo will be 
able to express themselves through 
the ballot boxes. The true evil will 
have been avoided and the lesser 
ones—reformed Cardenistas, de­
mocratized priistas, and provincial 
panistas—would exist in a country 
where everyone, including Com­
m ander Marcos and the inhabi­
tants of San Juan Chamula, would 
fit. This would not be the worst de­
velopment to stem from the take­
over of San Cristobal de las Casas. ■
Editor’s Note: Translated, with permis­
sion, by Hemisphere staff from an edi­
torial published in El Nuevo Herald 
(Miami, Florida) on January 6, 1994.
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After Chiapas: The Indian Agenda
by Martin Edwin Andersen
T he violence seemed like part of a well-known script. Masked young m en wear­ing baseball caps and bear­ing old rifles took control of town squares in a poor 
region far from the m odern com­
forts of the capital city. Stunned 
military and police, ja rred  from the 
stupor of their New Year’s revelry, 
called for reinforcements, then coun­
terattacked. As propeller-driven 
aircraft bom bed and strafed once- 
sleepy hamlets nestled in the m oun­
tains, the estimated 2,000 insurgents 
shrank back into the protective rain 
forest. Meanwhile, the government 
forces swelled to m ore than 10,000. 
The build-up was accom panied by 
displays of bodies—alleged to be 
those of guerrillas—with hands 
tied behind their backs and skulls 
shattered by pointblank bullets. In 
W ashington, strategic thinkers mut­
tered darkly about outside support 
for the unheard-of rebels.
The bloody rebellion by native 
Americans in the state of Chiapas 
in southern Mexico proved to be 
an international embarrassment 
for a country widely praised for its 
economic reforms. It also appeared 
timed to underm ine President Car­
los Salinas de Gortari just as the 
North American Free Trade Agree­
m ent (NAFTA) was coming into ef­
fect. While the rebels of the Ejercito 
Zapatista de Liberacion Nacional— 
nam ed for Emiliano Zapata, the 
hero of the 1910 Mexican Revolu­
tion—m elted into the surrounding 
countryside, the government retali-
Martin Edwin Andersen is a senior 
consultant at the Washington, DC- 
based Center for Democracy and a 
former professional staff member of the 
Senate Foreign Relations Committee.
ated with claims of foreign partici­
pation in the uprising. From the 
governm ent’s perspective, this was, 
perhaps, the best way to explain 
why the well-disciplined guerrillas 
had even seized the square in San 
Cristobal de las Casas (the second 
largest city in Chiapas with some
90,000 people), but it was not a 
claim borne out by guerrilla casual­
ties. The dead insurgents bore the 
physical features characteristic of 
the region’s Mayan tribes.
The situation in 
Chiapas mirrors the 
condition of native 
peoples in many areas 
of Mexico, home to 
Latin America’s 
largest indigenous 
population.
No one should be surprised by 
the uprising in Chiapas. It is Mex­
ico’s poorest state and the site of a 
long-running series of violations 
against the hum an rights of native 
peoples. It is also the scene of a vir­
tual assault by large landowners 
against the small agricultural hold­
ings of the Mayan, Tzeltale, Zapo- 
teco, Zoque, and other indigenous 
communities of the region. In re­
cent years, wealthy landowners have 
forced thousands off communal 
farm lands, known as ejidos, which 
according to official Mexican lore, 
are one of the most im portant so­
cial gains of the “Institutional Rev­
olution” inaugurated by Zapata 
and others. The guerrillas’ protest 
against what they called the Salinas 
governm ent’s complicity in rights 
violations and the erosion of their 
land rights was intensified by wor­
ries about what NAFTA will do to 
the price of corn—a staple—and by 
a fear that multinational corpora­
tions would be able to push those 
remaining off their lands.
The situation in Chiapas mirrors 
the condition of native peoples in 
many areas of Mexico, bome to 
Latin America’s largest indigenous 
population. More than a million 
Mexican Indians speak no Spanish, 
and eight times that many use na­
tive Indian languages as their pre­
ferred idiom. Nearly 70% of tbose 
who live in rural areas are con­
sidered by the governm ent to be 
“marginalized” (as the Mexican gov­
ernm ent refers to its Indian com­
munities) , with nine in ten outside 
the reach of sanitation and sewer­
age systems and thus victims of 
intestinal disease.
Indian Needs
To some observers, the Chiapas 
revolt, coming at the end of the 
UN “International Year of the 
W orld’s Indigenous Peoples,” un­
derscored the urgency of address­
ing the needs of Latin America’s 
35-40 million Indians—particularly 
their political rights and the protec­
tion of their lands and  resources. 
Victims of poverty, violence, and 
political and social marginaliza­
tion, the plight of native peoples 
has largely escaped the notice and 
attention of policymakers, both in 
Latin America and in Washington.
The rebellion was tragic proof 
of the risks posed by the failure of 
governments to protect the politi-
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GDP PER CAPITA AND REAL WAGEScal, social, and economic rights of native peoples. The degree to which 
the Zapatistas struck a popular chord 
throughout Mexico seemed to do 
as much with the widespread appeal 
of their demands—the protection 
of native lands, real democracy, and 
the fair treatm ent of native peo­
ples—as with the puckish and im­
passioned flair of their enigmatic 
leader, Subcom andante Marcos.
The Native Agenda
The grito de Chiapas reflected the 
serious problems confronted by an 
estimated 300 million indigenous 
peoples around the world. The in­
digenous agenda includes many of 
the most intriguing and urgent 
items that need to be addressed 
by policymakers as their countries 
approach the twenty-first century. 
These include:
■ the quest for broad and effective 
participation in newly emerging 
democracies;
■ hum an rights;
■ the growing recognition within 
the international scientific com­
munity of the contribution of tra­
ditional knowledge, particularly 
of plant resources, to science and 
technology;
■ mass migration across interna­
tional boundaries;
■ demilitarization;
■ environmental protection; and
■ a new framework for the decen­
tralization of decisionmaking 
within nations, allowing for more 
effective local self-governance.
As the seemingly endless stream 
of newspaper articles and editorials 
about Chiapas made clear, the in­
digenous revolution is here. The 
question is will it be largely non­
violent and beneficial to indige­
nous and tribal people, as well as 
the rest of humanity, or will it re­
sult in an endless series of “low- 
intensity conflicts.”
Indian advocates point out that, 
if violent episodes like that of Chia­
pas are to be kept from recurring, 
a systematic effort needs to be 
made to help indigenous peoples 
living in fragile environments to
Index: 1980=100
Source: UN Economic Commission on Latin America and the Caribbean
REAL URBAN M INIMUM WAGE
Source: UN Economic Commission on Latin America and the Caribbean
conserve their resources. Part of 
the solution is to ensure them  re­
source rights (access to land, water, 
and fuel), to prom ote their ability 
to defend their land and resource 
base, and to help them  m eet their 
needs in a m odern world without 
losing their time-honored resource 
m anagem ent methods. The con­
tinued progression of the global 
march to democracy as well as the 
protection of our common natural
inheritance requires helping in­
digenous peoples to take m eaning­
ful and representative roles in their 
own governments.
The Chiapas revolt spawned sev­
eral myths, which policymakers can 
ignore at their peril. The Salinas ad­
ministration was protecting its own 
vested interests when it dismissed 
pre-New Year’s reports of guerrilla 
activities as fabrications generated 
by its opponents and the opposition
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INDIGENOUS PEOPLES OF CENTRAL AND SOUTH AMERICA
Country Total Population(Millions)
Indigenous Population
(Percentage)
Argentina 31.9 1
Belize .2 10
Bolivia 6.5 66
Brazil 150.8
Chile 12.8
9
Colombia 31.9 1
Costa Rica 3.0 1
Ecuador 10.3 21
El Salvador 5.1 21
Guatemala 9.1 50
Guayana .4 1
Honduras 5.1 7
Mexico 86,4 11
Nicaragua 3.5 3
Panama 2.4 6
Paraguay 4.5 3
Peru 21.4 40
Suriname .8 3
Uruguay 3.0 —
Venezuela 19.3 1
Source: Central Intelligence Agency, 1990
to NAFTA. It is now clear, however, 
that the Mexican army was involved 
in a classic, and brutal, counter­
insurgency effort in the m ountains 
of Chiapas throughout 1993.
Following the revolt, the Salinas 
government tried to evade respon­
sibility for the conditions that led 
to the revolt by claiming the guer­
rillas had outside contacts and for­
eign supporters in their ranks. The 
causes of the revolt, however, were 
clearly Mexican in character and 
content. Manuel Camacho Solis— 
Salinas’s own special negotiator— 
gave lie to government claims that 
the Zapatistas were led by foreigners 
by describing the rebels as hom e­
grown insurgents; his use of the 
term “army” when describing the 
insurgents flew in the face of gov­
ernm ent claims that the guerrillas 
were a band of “lawbreakers.”
Finally, while the Zapatistas have 
stolen the headlines, most indige­
nous activism throughout the hem i­
sphere has been nonviolent, if not 
always peaceful. The Zapatistas’ 
leftist rhetoric should not be the 
prism through which all indige­
nous activism is evaluated. Indian 
issues are not, in the main, either 
“leftist” or “rightist,” although 
some activists may be thus charac­
terized. At the most fundam ental 
level, the indigenous agenda is one 
of political and economic empower­
m ent and, to a certain degree, of 
cultural sovereignty.
There is also the danger that the 
New Year’s Day revolt will become 
a pretext for spending m ore on the 
military, not just in Mexico, but 
throughout Latin America, and 
that indigenous activism may be­
come the new raison d ’etre for 
army involvement in internal secu­
rity. Chiapas has become the sym­
bol of what can go wrong when 
armies—even comparatively small
ones—attem pt to carry out tasks 
o ther than the defense of the na- 
tion-state against external threats. 
Inappropriate roles and missions, 
not necessarily size, are what make 
militaries potentially dangerous ac­
tors outside civilian control. The 
lack of effective recourse to a func­
tioning legal system, coupled with 
the employment of military forces 
as a virtual army of occupation, can 
be seen as an open invitation to the 
disenfranchised and disaffected to 
jo in  the Zapatista rebels.
T hroughout Latin America the 
absence of a unifying communist 
threat has sent militaries scram­
bling to define new threats to se­
curity as a means of holding onto 
budgets and prestige. Despite the 
fact that Mexico has one of the low­
est per capita military expenditures 
in Latin America, the lack of an ap­
propriate role and mission for its 
army is pushing the force to de­
m and a greater say in major na­
tional decisions, the antecham ber 
of militarism. This trend is exacer­
bated by a financial independence 
that dates back to the Mexican Rev­
olution, and now, by the events in 
Chiapas.
Tbat the military’s own role in 
internal security in Chiapas itself 
contributed to popular support for 
the Zapatista insurgents is evidenced 
by a 1993 Minnesota Advocates for 
Hum an Rights report about con­
ditions in the southern Mexican 
state. Despite a constitutional pro­
hibition against military involve­
m ent in domestic affairs, the report 
notes “troubling . . . signs of re­
newed involvement of the military 
in civilian affairs during the adm in­
istration of President Carlos Salinas 
de Gortari. . . . A nother disturbing 
development is the deployment of 
the army am ong the indigenous 
populations of southern Mexico— 
especially in Chiapas—where long- 
simmering land conflicts have been 
aggravated by the governm ent’s 
agrarian policy. . . . [L]awless prac­
tices of tbe Mexican military have 
become increasingly tolerated at 
the highest levels of the Mexican 
government. . . . The growing ac-
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ceptance of lawless military involve­
m ent in detentions and searches 
among civilian populations is a 
dangerous developm ent.”
Trained to employ maximum 
force to destroy an “enemy,” utiliz­
ing forces that are largely alien to 
the community in which they are 
deployed, illegal acts by the Mexi­
can army were almost inevitable— 
all the m ore so once the guerrilla 
insurgency burst forth with unsus­
pected force. In testimony before 
the US Congress on February 2,
1994, Assistant Secretary of State 
for Hum an Rights John  Shattuck 
pointed out that, despite reports of 
hundreds killed in the fighting in 
Chiapas, the government has never 
produced a single wounded prisoner!
According to many knowledge­
able observers, the Salinas govern­
m ent has increasingly used the 
army to intervene in political and 
labor disputes, as well as a major 
actor in the fight against narcotics 
trafficking. The Minnesota Advo­
cates report notes: “The militariza­
tion of the drug war is, in large 
measure, a result of the govern­
m en t’s inability or unwillingness to 
pursue serious reform  of the po­
lice,” even as the army has itself 
been implicated in almost surreal 
episodes of narcotics-related mis­
conduct, including the m urder of 
law enforcem ent officers. Mean­
while, in many precincts, antinar­
cotics police have had to buy their 
own am m unition, even though 
most local police make a mere 
$200 a month.
The events in Chiapas raised 
specific issues that are broadly rep­
resentative of the challenges facing 
indigenous peoples throughout the 
continent: tbe political empower­
m ent of indigenous peoples; the 
protection of their land rights; 
indigenous rights and the adm in­
istration of justice; and forest m an­
agem ent and the protection of 
indigenous cultures.
Political Empowerment
Bringing “marginalized” peoples 
into the democratic process is a key
com ponent for the consolidation 
of elected governments. Through­
out Latin America—but most cer­
tainly in Guatemala, Ecuador, Peru, 
and Bolivia—democratic participa­
tion cannot be limited to areas of 
relative privilege if the long-term 
prospects for democracy are to be 
secure. New and emerging democ­
racies can remain healthy only if 
they are fully representative.
Despite reports of 
hundreds killed in the 
figliting in Chiapas, 
the government never 
produced a single 
wounded prisoner.
In Guatemala nearly 60% of the 
country’s 10 million people are de­
scendants of the ancient Mayas, yet 
there are only six indigenous mem­
bers of the congress. Independent 
observers say one im portant factor 
in the low turnout in Guatemala’s 
crucial January referendum  on con­
stitutional reforms was the fact the 
ballots were printed only in Span­
ish, although hundreds of thou­
sands of potential voters speak only 
indigenous languages.
In Ecuador there is a single na­
tive American congressman. And 
in Bolivia, o f the 130 members of 
parliament, only three are indige­
nous, a fact ameliorated only par­
tially by the 1993 election of Victor 
Hugo Cardenas—a recognized na­
tive American leader—to the vice­
presidency.
Protection of Land Rights
Indian hom elands—in many cases 
the last remote forests, savannas, 
and wetlands of Latin America— 
are facing a ruthless onslaught by 
lawless cattle ranchers, loggers, and
landless peasants. Experts say—and 
the experience of Chiapas seems to 
bear out—that securing legal pro­
tection for their lands, and thus 
their way of life and the ecosystem 
that sustains it, is the greatest chal­
lenge faced by native peoples. In 
Mexico an estimated 70% of In­
dian land is forest. For example, 
the 50,000 Tarahum ara Indians of 
C hihuahua’s Sierra Madre Occiden­
tal live in one of the richest biosys­
tems in North America. Both the 
ecosystem, with its stunning variety 
of plants and animals, and the Tara­
hum ara Indians are at risk—victims 
of an unholy alliance of large land­
owners and drug traffickers. Inef­
fective policing by the Mexican 
army has helped to make the 
sprawling state on the US border a 
lawless cesspool of corruption.
In places such as Central Amer­
ica, where the population is ex­
pected to double within the next 
25 years, the increasing shortage of 
what were once “frontier” lands 
means that commercial agricul­
tural interests can only expand at 
the expense of native peoples and 
their control over their own territo­
ries. In Brazil, Ecuador, Bolivia, and 
elsewhere, land issues are at the 
forefront of the indigenous agenda.
An im portant part of helping 
indigenous peoples protect their 
lands is to help provide them  with 
the information and support needed 
to create accurate land-use maps, 
thus demolishing a racist myth that 
endures from the Spanish colonial 
era: that the remaining forests, sa­
vannas, and wetlands are “unin­
habited,” and therefore there for 
the taking.
O ne promising effort has been 
undertaken by native peoples in 
Honduras and Panama, assisted by 
the nongovernmental organization 
Native Lands. In both countries, In­
dians have escaped the invisibility 
myth by creating graphic, detailed 
records of their lands, including 
who lives there and how the land is 
used. By employing scientific maps 
and technical evaluations, native 
peoples can make credible cases 
for legalizing communal hom e­
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lands, stanching the invasions of 
their lands by landless peasants and 
m ultinational companies, and re­
solving on more favorable terms the 
relationship between Indian hom e­
lands and national protected areas.
Administration of Justice
The revolt in Chiapas has helped 
to focus attention on the need for 
new rules and new laws governing 
how countries treat their Indian na­
tions and other indigenous peoples. 
In countries as diverse as Guate­
mala, Nicaragua, and Peru, native 
Americans continue to be victim­
ized by military-run internal secu­
rity forces. Both the military and 
insurgent groups subject native 
Americans to forced recruitm ent 
and violence. The lack of repre­
sentative legal systems at the com­
munity level means the denial to 
native peoples of the full protec­
tion of the law, while indigenous 
lands continue to be overrun, con­
fiscated, or threatened.
Hum an rights advocates point 
out it is necessary to strengthen ci­
vilian justice systems—including po­
lice—at the local level in order to 
effectively confront abuses. Native 
American demands for legal protec­
tion through the creation and sup­
port of community and regional 
justice systems, including law en­
forcement, m irror the democratic 
experience of the US itself, where 
law enforcem ent is overwhelmingly 
civilian and local (as opposed to 
many countries of Latin America, 
where the arm ed forces still con­
trol the police). The creation of 
and support for local administra­
tion of justice helps to ensure com­
munity em powerm ent on issues of 
vital concern, and is directly re­
lated to questions of demilitariza­
tion and hum an rights.
Forest Management and the 
Protection of Indigenous Cultures
There is a growing recognition in 
Latin America of the needs of in­
digenous peoples who use forests 
as the basis for their livelihood,
social organization, or cultural 
identity. These groups and estab­
lished local communities that 
depend on forest resources have 
an economic stake in sustainable 
forest use. The international com­
munity can and should help in­
digenous peoples increase their 
capacity to protect their own lands 
and thus support sustainable re­
source use and the protection of 
the environment.
In countries as 
diverse as Guatemala, 
Nicaragua, and Peru, 
native Americans 
continue to be 
victimized by 
military-run internal 
security forces. Both 
the military and 
insurgent groups 
subject them to forced 
recruitment and 
violence.
Among those policy considera­
tions deserving of support and assis­
tance are:
■ the recognition of indigenous 
peoples and local community resi­
dents’ rights and cultural identity;
* the extension of an equal oppor­
tunity to indigenous peoples for 
full participation in their coun­
try’s life, including the life of the 
forest;
■ the exchange of information 
(with mutual protection of intel­
lectual property rights) between 
external research and technology 
generation and locally developed 
technology and indigenous knowl­
edge, as a means of more sustain­
ably managing forest resources;
■ empowering indigenous peoples 
and residents of local commu­
nities to ensure their effective 
participation in planning and 
decisionmaking related to the life 
of the forest, utilizing, as much as 
possible, the help of local and in­
ternational nongovernmental or­
ganizations and the private sector.
These efforts should also in­
clude the definition and strength­
ening of the participation and 
stake of indigenous peoples in lo­
cal, national, and international 
economies, particularly in the sus­
tainable harvest of both timber (in­
cluding fuel wood) and nontim ber 
forest products and services, and 
the facilitation and furthering of 
the cultural, educational, and eco­
nomic self-sufficiency of indige­
nous peoples.
Chiapas, and Beyond
During the Bush administration, 
the US was seen as unsympathetic 
to UN efforts to address the indige­
nous agenda. The Clinton adminis­
tration also got off to a slow start 
when the US delegation at the 
June 1993 hum an rights summit in 
Vienna was not even prepared to 
discuss indigenous rights (the sum­
m it’s second hottest topic after 
wom en’s rights).
The Clinton administration 
should clearly state that it is US pol­
icy to assist indigenous peoples, par­
ticularly in emerging democracies 
and in nations in which native peo­
ples are either a num erical major­
ity or a significant minority. One 
promising development came in 
late January, when the 1993 State 
D epartm ent country reports on hu­
man rights featured, for the first 
time, beefed up coverage of indige­
nous rights (thanks to legislation 
sponsored by form er senator Alan 
Cranston [D-CA]).
W here possible, native peoples 
must be included in sustainable de­
velopm ent strategies, particularly 
those that would enhance the pro­
tection of rain forests or o ther envi­
ronm ental treasures. The Clinton 
administration should also vigor-
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ously cham pion indigenous inter­
ests and concerns within the multi­
lateral developm ent banks and 
international trade organizations.
As a recent Congressional study 
on the impact of US foreign assis­
tance shows, the Agency for Inter­
national Development has done 
limited work in providing aid to in­
digenous peoples. US efforts, how­
ever, should reach out to m eet the 
special needs of indigenous peoples, 
rather than hoping they benefit in­
directly from programs aimed at 
rural peoples or the poor. Greater 
emphasis should be made on pro­
grams that facilitate indigenous 
institution-building and economic 
empowerment; fortify cultural iden­
tity; increase technical and profes­
sional training; and strengthen 
legal rights.
For better or worse, events in 
southern Mexico have riveted our 
attention at the point of a gun— 
albeit a rusty shotgun. Their m ean­
ing—the violence, the marginali­
zation, the potential for more 
resources to be funneled to the 
security forces and away from the 
people—needs, however, to be 
juxtaposed with recent develop­
ments in Bolivia. There the newly 
elected presidential ticket included 
an indigenous leader whose school­
teacher wife still wears the tradi­
tional dress—long black braid, 
multilayered skirt, felt shoes, and 
a bowler hat—of the Andean Alti- 
plano. The August 1993 inaugural 
address of vice president Victor 
Hugo Cardenas—whose presence 
on the ticket was instrum ental in 
achieving President Gonzalo San­
chez de Losada’s wide margin of 
victory—was given not only in 
Spanish, but also in the native 
languages of Aymara, Quechua, 
and Guarani.
“After 500 years of colonial si­
lence and after 168 of republican 
exclusion, we now speak up to tell 
our tru th ,” Cardenas said. “Democ­
racy in a country that is m ultieth­
nic, pluricultural, and plurilingual 
ought also to be m ultiethnic, pluri­
cultural, and plurilingual. . . .  A 
tree grows from its own roots.” ■
Indian Rights in Latin America
Guatemala
Indigenous people comprise one-half of the population but remain largely out­
side the country's political, economic, social and cultural mainstream. Indige­
nous people suffered most of the serious human rights abuses described
throughout this report---- Although indigenous people are accorded equal
rights by the Constitution, in practice they have only minimal participation in 
decisions affecting their lands, culture, traditions, and allocation of natural re­
sources----
Brazil
Brazil's approximately 250,000 Indians, who speak 170 different languages. . .  
have only a very limited ability to participate in decisions affecting their lands, 
cultures, traditions, and the allocation of natural resources.. . ,  [I]ndigenous
groups are marginalized from the political process---- [Tjllegal mining and
timber cutting are a constant problem on Indian lands. . . .  [T]wo [gold min­
ers] taken into custody [for the murder of 16 Yanomami Indians] were re­
leased on December 29 when their trial was delayed owing to difficulty in 
locating witnesses. There have been no convictions, however, in any previous 
case involving the murder of Indians___
Chile
In 1993 Congress passed a law that was drafted by a committee composed of 
representatives of the various indigenous groups, recognizing the ethnic diver­
sity of the indigenous populations. It replaced a law that emphasized assimila­
tion, and it gives them a greater voice in decisions affecting their lands,
cultures and traditions---- The population which identifies itself as indigenous
(nearly I million, according to the 1992 census) remains separated from the 
rest of society, largely because of historical, cultural, educational, and geo­
graphical factors... .
The degree to which indigenous peoples participate in the political process, 
their exercise of civil rights, and the extent of their control over natural re­
sources and land varies widely from one ethnic group to another, and from 
one region of the country to another. The indigenous population, estimated at
100,000, is concentrated at the northern and southern extremities of the coun­
try.. . .  In 1987 Congress passed a law designed to return Indian lands. It has 
yet to be implemented. . ..
Mexico
The Government encourages indigenous groups, many of which do not speak 
Spanish, to participate in political life, and it is respectful of their desire to re­
tain elements of their traditional lifestyle---- [T]hese groups remain largely
outside the country’s political and economic mainstream, a result of longstand­
ing patterns of economic and social development, and in many cases their abil­
ity to participate in decisions affecting their lands, cultural traditions, and the 
allocation of natural resources is negligible. At the beginning of 1994, these 
problems were particularly highlighted by an armed uprising in Chiapas state,.
Editor’s Note: Excerpts from the 1993 State Department country reports on human rights, 
which for the first time included extensive reporting on the political, economic, and cul­
tural rights of indigenous peoples, as required by the Cranston Amendment.
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The New Agrarian Reform
by Othon Banos Ramirez
exico’s new agrarian 
reform  law was cre­
ated to end not only 
the social redistribu­
tion of rural prop­
erties, but also the 
intervention of the state in the in­
ternal life of the ejidos (collectively 
owned agricultural properties) and 
rural communities in general. The 
Mexican government expects that 
these reforms will stimulate the 
m odernization of the agrarian 
economy. Undoubtedly the new 
law, which went into effect in Feb­
ruary 1992, inaugurates a new stage 
in Mexican agrarian policy. Since 
the revolution of 1910-40, that pol­
icy has revolved around the legal 
regularization of campesino owner­
ship of land, a focus that gave rise 
to the ejidos. Today, the ejidos num ­
ber 28,000 and comprise 50% of 
Mexico’s cultivable land.
The Farm Crisis
Mexico has been facing an agricul­
tural crisis since the 1970s. In re­
sponse, President Carlos Salinas de 
Gortari has chosen the most practi­
cal—and perhaps the only—option: 
the fundam ental transformation of 
the ejido system. Since 1988 Salinas 
has insisted that “the massive re­
distribution of rural property has 
ended. Whoever claims t h a t . . . mil­
lions of hectares [remain] to be re-
Othon Banos Ramirez is a professor and 
researcher at the Centro de Investiga- 
ciones Regionales “Dr. Hideyo Noguchi” 
of the Universidad Autonoma de Yu­
catan in Merida, Mexico. He is the 
author o/Campesinos y sociedad: 
ayer y hoy (Universidad Autonoma 
de Yucatan, 1992).
distributed is lying to the almost 
two million persons who seek such 
land and to the more than four 
million agricultural workers.” The 
key objectives of his agrarian pro­
gram are fourfold:
■ to ensure the security of property 
holdings;
■ to reverse the growth of small 
holdings by prom oting the estab­
lishment of producer associations 
based on the investment of pri­
vate capital;
■ to reduce government subsidies 
for agricultural production; and
■ to reduce the state’s role in agri­
cultural production and commerce, 
including the dismantling of 
parastatal agencies in agriculture.
Th e new agrarian 
reform leaves most 
campesinos extremely 
vulnerable. It leaves 
the majority of them 
without financial 
credit, forces them to 
seek wage work, and 
undermines their 
political leverage.
As part of this process, the Salinas 
administration has been restructur­
ing the Instituto Mexicano del Cafe 
and reorienting the functions of 
CONASUPO (National Basic Foods 
Company) and the governm ent’s
main institutional linkages with the 
countryside, the Secretaria de Agri­
culture y Recursos Hidraulicos and 
the Banco Nacional Rural.
The new politics of agrarian 
reform leaves most campesinos ex­
tremely vulnerable. For example, in 
Yucatan, market-oriented reforms 
in 1990 left many henequen-pro- 
ducing ejidatarios without credit 
and unable to harvest their crop. 
Moreover, by forcing them  to seek 
wage work on an individual basis, 
the reform undercut the collective 
organization that had been the ba­
sis of what little political leverage 
they previously exercised. These 
serious problems have affected 
corn, citrus, and vegetable pro­
ducers as well.
Preferential Treatment
The governm ent’s posture is to give 
preferential treatm ent to the most 
productive ejidos (which are located 
mainly in northern  Mexico), at the 
expense of self-sufficient ejidos (lo­
cated mainly in central Mexico) 
and poor ejidos (which are the ma­
jority of ejidos nationwide and are 
located mainly in the south). By 
providing minimal credit for the 
cultivation of poor ejido land, the 
government does no t prom ote their 
productivity, but merely delays the 
migratory exit of the rural popula­
tion in the ejido communities and 
maintains its political clientele in 
the countryside.
In the context of the presidential 
election of August 1994, the latter 
is especially crucial given not only 
the Chiapas rebellion but also the 
assassination of the Partido Revo­
lucionario Institucional’s official 
presidential candidate, Luis Do- 
naldo Colosio, both which have 
increased the urgency of maintain­
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ing the party’s traditional electoral 
machinery in the provinces. To 
achieve this objective, the govern­
m ent has increased its social ex­
penditures through its National 
Solidarity Program, which targets 
the urban poor, peasants, and 
indigenous peoples with various 
developm ent projects for sewage 
and potable water, health, educa­
tion, food distribution, electrifica­
tion, street paving, housing, and 
soft loans for low-income rural 
producers.
The new agrarian reform  ap­
pears favorable to those ejidos with 
the greatest potential for produc­
tivity, some of which may be trans­
formed into something like the 
cattle project of Nuevo Leon in 
northern  Mexico. In this agro­
industrial enterprise involving 336 
associated producers, private initia­
tive invested m ore than $6 million 
in ejido lands, with profits appar­
ently in excess of $2 million in 
1991. But this highly successful, 
highly publicized project is a strik­
ing exception to the rule. In gen­
eral the establishment of such 
complexes of associated producers 
has been unsuccessful unless the 
state itself has played an active role. 
According to many experts, such 
enterprises are m ere fronts for 
large-scale agricultural land rental 
by private investors who maintain 
control over their business opera­
tions. Foreign investment under 
these arrangem ents has principally 
occurred through “contract agricul­
tu re” in export horticulture.
Contradictory Reactions
Over the medium and long run 
the new agrarian law will cause di­
verse and contradictory reactions 
according to the specific agricul­
tural setting and product. Focusing 
on ejidos, we can foresee the em er­
gence of an extremely complicated 
social problem  that is intimately 
tied to Mexico’s politics, culture, 
and economy. The Mexican gov­
ernm ent recognizes that, of the na­
tion’s population of 85 million, at 
least 41 million persons live in pov­
erty, and of these 17 million live in 
extreme poverty. Many of the ex­
tremely poor are small ejidatarios.
In opening up new 
market opportunities 
for Mexican agriculture 
while failing to 
prepare or support 
ejidatarios, the 
Salinas administration 
is abandoning 
thousands of poor 
campesinos, leaving 
them with few  
prospects.
Two perspectives have em erged 
concerning the “reform of agrarian 
reform .” An optimistic view affirms 
that, thanks to the new legislation, 
more private investment will flow 
into agriculture, thereby m odern­
izing the sector and boosting its 
productivity and output. The pes­
simistic view argues that the new 
law will cause a massive sale of ejido 
landholdings that will inevitably re­
sult in the concentration of rural 
property in the hands of a small 
circle of wealthy and powerful 
owners and accelerate the migra­
tion of the countryside’s poor peo­
ple to cities in Mexico and the US. 
Although it is still too early to tell, 
neither extrem e has yet occurred, 
though trends suggesting the valid­
ity of both sides of the argum ent 
have emerged.
With respect to the North Ameri­
can Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), 
Mexican authorities have yet to 
publicize a coherent plan for pre­
paring the nation’s agricultural
sector for competition with the 
business giants to the north. In the­
ory, the ending of government sub­
sidies, technical support, and other 
forms of aid to small agricultural 
producers will be more than com­
pensated by a surge in private 
domestic and foreign capital, the 
m odernization of technology, and 
access to larger and m ore lucrative 
markets. In the best of cases, how­
ever, very few campesinos will im­
prove their economic standing. The 
great majority will become marginal­
ized. Indeed, from the standpoint 
of government policymakers, tradi­
tional campesinos pose an obstacle 
to national economic development. 
The politics of the new agrarian 
reform seeks to eliminate this ob­
stacle by transforming traditional 
campesinos into either “small farm­
ers” of the US variety or a cheap, 
ejido-anchored rural labor force for 
highly capitalized agriculture.
In this setting, the new agrarian 
reform could lead to the worsening 
of the socioeconomic polarization 
of Mexican agriculture and to con­
siderable growth in the political 
clout of large agricultural enter­
prises. In opening up new market 
opportunities for Mexican agricul­
ture while failing to prepare or 
support ejidatarios, the Salinas ad­
ministration is abandoning thou­
sands of poor campesinos, leaving 
them  with few prospects beyond 
mere survival and turning them 
into a low-wage subsidy for both 
m odernized agriculture and the 
m anufacturing and service sectors.
The new agrarian reform is 
integral to a policy of accelerated 
introduction of advanced methods 
in agricultural production, thereby 
preparing Mexico for a new stage 
of economic developm ent and, 
through NAFTA, economic inte­
gration with the US and Canada. 
This policy promises greater pro­
ductivity, but fewer jobs. Poor cam­
pesinos will end up losing what little 
they have and, facing even more ex­
treme poverty in the countryside, 
will exit en masse to the cities—in­
cluding those cities across the bor­
der to the north. ■
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distributed is lying to the almost 
two million persons who seek such 
land and to the more than four 
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key objectives of his agrarian pro­
gram are fourfold:
■ to ensure the security of property 
holdings;
■ to reverse the growth of small 
holdings by prom oting the estab­
lishment of producer associations 
based on the investment of pri­
vate capital;
■ to reduce government subsidies 
for agricultural production; and
• to reduce the state’s role in agri­
cultural production and commerce, 
including the dismantling of 
parastatal agencies in agriculture.
The new agrarian 
reform leaves most 
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vulnerable. It leaves 
the majority of them 
without financial 
credit, forces them to 
seek wage work, and 
undermines their 
political leverage.
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countryside, the Secretaria de Agri­
culture y Recursos Hidraulicos and 
the Banco Nacional Rural.
The new politics of agrarian 
reform leaves most campesinos ex­
tremely vulnerable. For example, in 
Yucatan, market-oriented reforms 
in 1990 left many henequen-pro- 
ducing ejidatarios without credit 
and unable to harvest their crop. 
Moreover, by forcing them  to seek 
wage work on an individual basis, 
the reform undercut the collective 
organization that had been the ba­
sis of what little political leverage 
they previously exercised. These 
serious problems have affected 
corn, citrus, and vegetable pro­
ducers as well.
Preferential Treatment
The governm ent’s posture is to give 
preferential treatm ent to the most 
productive ejidos (which are located 
mainly in northern  Mexico), at the 
expense of self-sufficient ejidos (lo­
cated mainly in central Mexico) 
and poor ejidos (which are the ma­
jority of ejidos nationwide and are 
located mainly in the south). By 
providing minimal credit for the 
cultivation of poor ejido land, the 
government does no t prom ote their 
productivity, but merely delays the 
migratory exit of the rural popula­
tion in the ejido communities and 
maintains its political clientele in 
the countryside.
In the context of the presidential 
election of August 1994, the latter 
is especially crucial given no t only 
the Chiapas rebellion but also the 
assassination of the Partido Revo­
lucionario Institucional’s official 
presidential candidate, Luis Do- 
naldo Colosio, both which have 
increased the urgency of maintain­
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ing the party’s traditional electoral 
machinery in the provinces. To 
achieve this objective, the govern­
m ent has increased its social ex­
penditures through its National 
Solidarity Program, which targets 
the urban poor, peasants, and 
indigenous peoples with various 
developm ent projects for sewage 
and potable water, health, educa­
tion, food distribution, electrifica­
tion, street paving, housing, and 
soft loans for low-income rural 
producers.
The new agrarian reform  ap­
pears favorable to those ejidos with 
the greatest potential for produc­
tivity, some of which may be trans­
formed into something like the 
cattle project of Nuevo Leon in 
northern  Mexico. In this agro­
industrial enterprise involving 336 
associated producers, private initia­
tive invested m ore than $6 million 
in ejido lands, with profits appar­
ently in excess of $2 million in
1991. But this highly successful, 
highly publicized project is a strik­
ing exception to the rule. In gen­
eral the establishment of such 
complexes of associated producers 
has been unsuccessful unless the 
state itself has played an active role. 
According to many experts, such 
enterprises are m ere fronts for 
large-scale agricultural land rental 
by private investors who maintain 
control over their business opera­
tions. Foreign investment under 
these arrangem ents has principally 
occurred through “contract agricul­
tu re” in export horticulture.
Contradictory Reactions
Over the medium and long run 
the new agrarian law will cause di­
verse and contradictory reactions 
according to the specific agricul­
tural setting and product. Focusing 
on ejidos, we can foresee the em er­
gence of an extremely complicated 
social problem  that is intimately 
tied to Mexico’s politics, culture, 
and economy. The Mexican gov­
ernm ent recognizes that, of the na­
tion’s population of 85 million, at 
least 41 million persons live in pov­
erty, and of these 17 million live in 
extreme poverty. Many of the ex­
tremely poor are small ejidatarios.
In opening up new 
market opportunities 
for Mexican agriculture 
while failing to 
prepare or support 
ejidatarios, the 
Salinas administration 
is abandoning 
thousands of poor 
campesinos, leaving 
diem with few  
prospects.
Two perspectives have em erged 
concerning the “reform of agrarian 
reform .” An optimistic view affirms 
that, thanks to the new legislation, 
more private investment will flow 
into agriculture, thereby m odern­
izing the sector and boosting its 
productivity and output. The pes­
simistic view argues that the new 
law will cause a massive sale of ejido 
landholdings that will inevitably re­
sult in the concentration of rural 
property in the hands of a small 
circle of wealthy and powerful 
owners and accelerate the migra­
tion of the countryside’s poor peo­
ple to cities in Mexico and the US. 
Although it is still too early to tell, 
neither extrem e has yet occurred, 
though trends suggesting the valid­
ity of both sides of the argum ent 
have emerged.
With respect to the North Ameri­
can Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), 
Mexican authorities have yet to 
publicize a coherent plan for pre­
paring the nation’s agricultural
sector for competition with the 
business giants to the north. In the­
ory, the ending of government sub­
sidies, technical support, and other 
forms of aid to small agricultural 
producers will be more than com­
pensated by a surge in private 
domestic and foreign capital, the 
m odernization of technology, and 
access to larger and m ore lucrative 
markets. In the best of cases, how­
ever, very few campesinos will im­
prove their economic standing. The 
great majority will become marginal­
ized. Indeed, from the standpoint 
of government policymakers, tradi­
tional campesinos pose an obstacle 
to national economic development. 
The politics of the new agrarian 
reform seeks to eliminate this ob­
stacle by transforming traditional 
campesinos into either “small farm­
ers” of the US variety or a cheap, 
e/ido-anchored rural labor force for 
highly capitalized agriculture.
In this setting, the new agrarian 
reform could lead to the worsening 
of the socioeconomic polarization 
of Mexican agriculture and to con­
siderable growth in the political 
clout of large agricultural enter­
prises. In opening up new market 
opportunities for Mexican agricul­
ture while failing to prepare or 
support ejidatarios, the Salinas ad­
ministration is abandoning thou­
sands of poor campesinos, leaving 
them  with few prospects beyond 
mere survival and turning them 
into a low-wage subsidy for both 
m odernized agriculture and the 
m anufacturing and service sectors.
The new agrarian reform is 
integral to a policy of accelerated 
introduction of advanced methods 
in agricultural production, thereby 
preparing Mexico for a new stage 
of economic developm ent and, 
through NAFTA, economic inte­
gration with the US and Canada. 
This policy promises greater pro­
ductivity, but fewer jobs. Poor cam­
pesinos will end up losing what little 
they have and, facing even more ex­
treme poverty in the countryside, 
will exit en masse to the cities—in­
cluding those cities across the bor­
der to the north. ■
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War and Accountability in Guatemala
by Walter Gillis Peacock
B etw een Two A rm ies in  th e  Ixil 
Tow ns o f  G ua tem ala  
by David Stoll. Columbia University 
Press, 1993. $47.50 cloth; $17.50paper.
I
n Guatemala during the late 
1970s and early 1980s, the 
team of sociologists with which 
I was doing research was often 
stopped by the military or na­
tional police at unexpected 
checkpoints in the highlands. Even 
though field work is always compli­
cated by unanticipated difficulties, 
these encounters were dangerous 
with high levels of uncertainty. On 
one occasion a young officer pulled 
an extra pistol from the small of his 
back, moved toward our vehicle, 
and told us we would give him a 
ride to the next town and that only 
Spanish would be spoken. His “re­
quest” was not questioned. In these 
instances, the limited restraint dis­
played was probably due to our US 
passports. Unfortunately, no such 
protection existed for tens of thou­
sands who were subject to the bru­
tal excesses of Guatemala’s military 
during the same period.
In Between Two Armies in the Ixil 
Towns of Guatemala, anthropologist 
David Stoll has taken up the task of 
giving a voice to some who were tar­
gets of the military’s scorched earth 
policy. Stoll seeks to “rein terpret 
the recent history of Ixil country in 
a way more in accord with how the
Walter Gillis Peacock is an associate 
professor of sociology at Florida Interna­
tional University. He is the co-author 
(with Frederick L. Bates) of Living 
Conditions, Disasters, and Devel­
opment: An Approach to Cross- 
Cultural Comparisons (Athens: 
University of Georgia Press, 1993).
inhabitants talk about it” (p. xiii). 
He also wants to remove the ro­
mantic surrealism he finds so prev­
alent in the scholarly literature on 
guerrilla insurgencies and revolu­
tionary movements, which, along 
with the solidarity and hum an 
rights movements, is influenced by 
“left-wing mythology.” He ques­
tions the prevalent “reinterpreta­
tions” of the Guatemalan holocaust 
and its characterization that use 
terms like “oppression,” “rebellion,” 
and “resistance.”
Stoll wants to 
remove the romantic 
surrealism he finds 
so prevalent in the 
literature on guerrilla 
insurgencies.
In attempting to find the “voices” 
of the Ixil, Stoll worked in areas 
controlled by the Guatemalan mili­
tary in and around the towns of 
Chajul, Cotzal, and Nebaj, where 
he lived from October 1988 to Sep­
tem ber 1989. He interviewed vil­
lage representatives, “religious 
leaders, labor contractors, and 
other groups of interest,” and sur­
veyed 164 Ixil leaders or entrepre­
neurs and 98 household heads in 
an outlying neighborhood of Nebaj 
that “absorbed many refugees from 
destroyed aldeas [villages]” (p. 13). 
While acknowledging potential se­
lectivity bias because he could not 
interview any of the tens of thou­
sands who had been killed or disap­
peared and did not interview any of 
the more than 12,000 Ixils living in 
“communities of population in re­
sistance,” Stoll maintains that his 
data provide insight into why the 
military won the war, why the revo­
lutionary movement failed in the 
western highlands in particular, 
and “how outsiders project their 
agendas into peasant populations, 
how political violence emerges, and 
how non-combatants respond to it” 
in Guatemala and other parts of 
the world (p. 14).
The Scorched Earth Policy
After listening to these voices,
Stoll’s conclusions challenge revi­
sionist accounts of the violence that 
hold that it was yet another in the 
long history of attempts by high­
land Indians to improve themselves 
and assert their hum an rights, and 
of brutal attacks by the military to 
suppress those popular movements. 
As Stoll notes, “to discourage Ixil 
farmers for helping the guerrillas, 
the army burned down all hamlets 
and homesteads outside the three 
towns. At first in reaction to guer­
rilla ambushes, then by plan, army 
units shot, hacked, or burned to 
death thousands of unarm ed men, 
women, and children” (p. 4). For 
Stoll, the entire blame for the 
army’s scorched earth policy and 
unspeakable brutality must be laid 
squarely at the feet of the Ejercito 
Guerrillero de los Pobres (EGP).
He maintains “the only reason the 
army attacked Ixils was to get at the 
EGP” (p. 20).
Furtherm ore, he suggests that 
the EGP was neither a popular nor 
indigenous movement that cap­
tured the aspirations of Ixils, sug­
gesting instead the existence of a 
“gap between revolutionary politics
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on the national level and the poli­
tics of the western highlands, that 
is, between the ladino-dominated 
Left and Mayan Indians” (p. 89). 
While the EGP was operating in 
Ixil country in the early 1970s, Stoll 
discounts Ixil involvement as lim­
ited, consisting of only “militants” 
and disillusioned radical students.
It was “only after EGP military units 
appeared, am bushed soldiers, and 
provoked wider reprisals against 
the population did thousands of 
Ixils jo in  their revolutionary move­
ment, to protect themselves from 
the army” (p. 88). Despite his own 
reckoning that the majority of EGP 
combatants are Ixils, that they are 
central to the com m and structure, 
and that as many as 17,000 Ixils 
remain in EGP controlled areas, 
the fact the EGP did not spontane­
ously arise am ong Ixils precludes its 
claiming the label “popular,” and, 
in the final analysis, any claim of 
legitimacy.
Defining Moment
Stoll’s analysis of the violence is 
quite narrow in both temporal and 
spatial considerations. While m en­
tioning the history of Indian sup­
pression and that the Ixils were 
ruled by a police state, 1975 be­
comes the defining m om ent, the 
starting point, for his analysis be­
cause it was the year of the first EGP 
raids. It appears that Stoll considers 
the state’s actions so out of charac­
ter, if not in form then certainly in 
magnitude, that something must 
have provoked its action. What 
came before is of little or no rele­
vance in his analysis. In addition, 
what occurred or occurs outside the 
confines of Ixil country is of little 
relevance, except that this bound­
ary defines the EGP as an external,
nonindigenous, and hence illegiti­
mate movement that corrupted the 
Ixils. The fact the military might 
also be considered illegitimate by 
the same criterion is not considered 
or questioned.
Stoll is at his best within the 
temporal and spatial boundaries 
that he sets. It has long been noted 
that Guatemala’s Indians have not 
played central roles in revolutionary 
movements and their use of struc­
tures originally imposed upon 
them, such as the cofradia (relig­
ious brotherhood), to define their 
own sphere of control or “civil soci­
ety” is also well docum ented. Stoll 
has added to these themes by cap­
turing how Ixils have responded to 
“the violence by m anufacturing a 
new kind of neutralism for them ­
selves and recreating institutional 
space to make their own choice”
(p. 13). He docum ents the relation­
ship between the military and re­
maining Ixils, the em ergence of 
the civil patrols, the growth and 
spread of evangelical Protestantism, 
and the use of evangelicalism and 
the civil patrols as mechanisms for 
establishing a reform ulated civil 
society. Furtherm ore, his accounts 
of the ebb and flow of Ixil support
for the EGP and the perspectives of 
Ixils under military control should 
be read by all students of revolu­
tion and social movements.
Multiple Realities
Conversely Stoll is at his worst in 
placing the violence of Ixil country 
in the larger historical and contem ­
porary setting o f Guatemala. In per­
haps the most poignant statem ent 
that captures both the strengths 
and weaknesses of the book, Stoll 
notes, “While Ixils . . . have not 
adopted the army’s point of view, 
they do accept its definition of what 
is possible . . . because it is corrobo­
rated by their own experience of 
the realities of power” (p. 164).
Stoll has done an impressive job  of 
connecting us with the realities of 
Guatemala, from the perspective of 
the Ixils who have rem ained or re­
turned (either by force or choice) 
to the “old law” of an oppressive 
state. Nonetheless, as social scien­
tists, can or should we stop there?
In the world of multiple realities, 
all of which are shaped by social 
forces, Stoll’s acceptance of this 
single world view results in large 
elements of his book seemingly 
apologizing for the Guatemalan 
military. The military—through its 
dom ination of rem aining Ixils— 
has defined for Stoll no t only what 
is possible, but the justification for 
eradicating tens o f thousands of 
men, women, and children. The 
legitimacy of the military is never 
questioned; it is a given.
The Nicaraguan revolution, the 
massive infusion o f development 
programs into the highlands follow­
ing the 1976 earthquake, and the 
removal of political restraints by 
the Reagan administration are but 
a few of the o ther factors that must
Guatemala’s Indians 
have not played 
central roles in the 
country’s revolutionary 
movements.
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be considered when addressing the 
violence in the western highlands 
of Guatemala. For example, the 
military was fearful that the suc­
cesses of the Sandinistas—which 
followed a major natural disaster 
like Guatemala’s—would be played 
out again, this time in Guatemala. 
Following the earthquake, state of­
ficials, unable to m eet massive re­
construction and emergency needs 
and under foreign pressure to avoid 
a repeat of Somoza’s extraordinary 
corruption and ineptitude, granted 
international agencies a free hand 
at establishing their programs. That 
free hand was severed by the mili­
tary coup of the early 1980s, and 
its imprints were being wiped out 
throughout the highlands and the 
city as developm ent programs were 
forced to close and grassroots re­
construction committees were tar­
geted for death. Clearly the EGP 
and Ixil country were targeted for 
particularly brutal attention in part 
because the EGP represented a visi­
ble threat and was symbolic of the 
state’s loss of control. Yet it was but 
part of a wave of oppression and 
destruction that occurred through­
out the country. For Stoll to lay the 
blame exclusively at the feet of the 
EGP is an extraordinarily short­
sighted oversimplification.
The Chiapas Comparison
This review is being written at the 
same time that the Mexican gov­
ernm ent is negotiating with the Za­
patista guerrillas in Chiapas, just 
across the border from Guatemala. 
Many of the same arguments voiced 
by Stoll are being heard, such as 
that the Zapatistas are not really an 
indigenous group, that their lead­
ers are not really Indians, and that 
they do not represent Indian as­
pirations. I am sure Stoll would 
question the characterization of 
the Zapatistas as a “popular” force. 
Prior to the success of their January 
1 military action, it probably would
have been difficult to find over­
whelming popular support for the 
guerrillas am ong Indians; 10 years 
from now one may well have dif­
ficulty finding a majority that 
supported the Zapatistas, except 
am ong “militants,” “ex-combat- 
ants,” or “disillusioned radicals.”
It is doubtful, however, that many 
will question the legitimacy of the 
Zapatista claims.
Let’s hope that an apologetic 
account of why tens of thousands 
of innocent men, women, and chil­
dren were killed, just so the mili­
tary could “get a t” the Zapatista 
guerrillas, will not need to be writ­
ten. The Mexican state is no stran­
ger to the use of military force. 
Still, the fact that Mexico’s state 
leadership derives its legitimacy 
from popular and revolutionary 
ideology means that political and 
social reform  is likely to play a 
much greater role in state-Indian 
relations in Chiapas than it has in 
Guatemala. ■
A  MAJOR CHARITABLE GIFT OPPORTUNITY FOR THE RIGHT PHILANTHROPIST
The MEDICAL, EYE & DENTAL INTERNATIONAL CARE ORGANIZATION, Inc., an independent 501 (c)3 
organization based in Austin, Texas, has sent 274 volunteers from throughout the United States to 
remote areas of Central America providing free health, dental and vision care to nearly 20,000 
poverty stricken children, men and women. Since being chartered in August of 1990, members of 
twenty M.E.D.I.C.O. teams have spent one week of their time, sharing their concern and talents at 
their own expense. M.E.D.I.C.O. has been recognized by Honduran government and medical 
authorities as a significant contributor in their nation's health care program. M.E.D.I.C.O. has seven 
teams scheduled for 1993, including two special surgical teams.
To date, M.E.D.I.C.O. has been administered by volunteers. The growth and success of the 
program now requires the services of a full-time administrator and an endowment to financially 
support this position.
The founders and volunteers of M.E.D.I.C.O. invite contributions from major potential donors to help 
underwrite the operational costs of this much needed and expanding program. With a proven 
track record, the opportunity to be an integral part of a heartwarming successful humanitarian 
foundation is very real.
For More Information, Contact:
Norm Peters, Chairman, Board of Directors 
M.E.D.I.C.O., Inc.
1107 Main Street, Georgetown, Texas 78626 
Telephone (512) 863-8217 or fax (512) 863-8666.
M.E.D.I.C.Gi
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Love-Death among the Guerrillas
by David Stoll
B ridge o f  C ourage: Life S tories 
o f  th e  G u a tem alan  C o m p an ero s 
a n d  C o m p an eras
by Jennifer Harbury. Monroe, Me.: 
Common Courage Press, 1993.
I
n Septem ber 1992 a North 
American lawyer went on a 
week-long hunger strike out­
side an army base in Guate­
mala City. Armed with a novel, 
Jennifer Harbury camped in 
front of a grim fortress where se­
cret prisoners are said to ro t in un­
derground cells. Inspections of the 
interior yielded nothing, but H ar­
bury, like thousands of o ther wom­
en in Guatemala, wanted to know 
what the army had done with her 
husband.
Harbury’s spouse is one of 
thousands of Guatemalans who, 
since the late 1960s, have “disap­
peared” in the hands of the coun­
try’s security forces. Efrafn Bamaca 
Velasquez—better known as “Co- 
m andante Everardo”—belonged to 
the Organizacion del Pueblo en 
Armas (ORPA), one of four small 
guerrilla armies in the Union Revo- 
lucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca 
(URNG). The struggle dates back 
to 1954, when the CIA overthrew 
an elected government challenging 
US interests. Ever since, Guatemala 
has been dom inated by its army, 
and North Americans drawn to this 
Central American country have 
struggled with a profound sense of 
guilt. Some of us have embarked 
on political journeys like Harbury’s.
David Stoll, an anthropologist, is the 
author of Between Two Armies in 
the Ixil Towns of Guatemala (Co­
lumbia University Press, 1993).
A Harvard law school graduate 
from Texas, she is far from the first 
gringo to become romantically in­
volved with a Central American rev­
olution. But she may be the first to 
have written a book about her ex­
periences, and it is a candid one. 
Mainly a collection of testimonials 
from active and form er combatants, 
Bridge of Courage leaves readers with 
powerful impressions of how brutal 
the security forces can be, and of 
the courage required to oppose 
them. I was left with an additional 
reaction, however, because of my 
experience with a different slice of 
Guatemalan life than the one in 
which Harbury immersed herself. 
For me as an anthropologist, the 
stories in the book call into ques­
tion the ethics of guerrilla warfare.
Harbury is fa r from  
the first gringo to 
become romantically 
involved with a 
Central American 
revolution.
O f m ounting raids and then dis­
appearing, blurring the distinction 
between combatants and civilians, 
so that those who remain behind 
to face the army’s rage are bewil­
dered bystanders. O f setting up 
front groups that implicate wider 
circles of people, many of them  un­
knowing. O f dem anding civil guar­
antees from the same system you 
are trying to overthrow through 
arm ed struggle. And of continuing 
the war in the face of what I and
many other observers (although 
not Harbury) take to be widespread 
popular disillusion with it.
“Bodyguard” on the Edge
Harbury’s first contact with Guate­
mala was working with illegal im­
migrants petitioning for political 
asylum in the US. Frustrated by ju ­
dicial rejection of her clients, she 
went to Guatemala to track down 
hum an rights testimony for them. 
Before long, Harbury was also an un­
arm ed “bodyguard” for Guatema­
lans in danger of being kidnapped, 
and this soon led to contacts with 
the clandestine support networks 
of ORPA. That is, she was on the 
periphery of one of the under­
ground military organizations 
whose activities have, for nearly 
30 years, strengthened the Guate­
malan army’s rationale for building 
up a national security state.
At first, Harbury collected the 
stories of guerrilla cadres who sur­
vived the army’s destruction of 
their urban safehouses, and of hu­
man rights activists being tracked 
down by the army with equal merci­
lessness. Their memories were so 
heart-rending that she headed for 
the mountains to interview combat­
ants. It was during these visits that 
she m et one of the first Mam Ma­
yan Indians to jo in  ORPA, Coman- 
dante Everardo, whom she m arried 
only months before he disappeared 
amid a fire fight in March 1992. 
When Harbury dem anded to know 
what had happened to her hus­
band, the army claimed he had 
killed himself to avoid capture—a 
not implausible scenario as many 
guerrillas had opted for suicide 
over capture. But Harbury was de­
term ined to confirm this claim and 
pressed to have his body exhumed.
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The body turned out to be some­
one else’s. Meanwhile, an escaped 
prisoner reported seeing a severely 
battered Everardo at an army base 
where captured guerrillas are “re­
program m ed” to jo in  government 
death squads.
Hence, it is no t surprising that 
Harbury’s campaign to make the 
army observe the Geneva conven­
tions has gotten a warm response 
from many Guatemalans. But is 
Harbury correct when stating that 
many Guatemalans want the URNG 
to keep fighting? And is supporting 
arm ed struggle the only alternative 
for the Guatemalan left, as she also 
seems to assume?
Consider for a m om ent the case 
of Santiago Atitlan, a town that 
used to be a hotbed of ORPA re­
cruiting in the early 1980s. To 
defend themselves from army 
depredations, in 1990 the Atitecos 
forced the army to close its base. 
Then they asked ORPA to stay away, 
too. Their success in mobilizing 
hum an rights support, and the 
growing presence of hum an rights 
activists like Harbury, suggests that 
guerrilla warfare is not the only 
option for Guatemalans.
Contrary to the claim made by 
Harbury and others that repression 
is getting worse, the army has, in 
fact, been forced to scale back its 
abuses under the weight of domes­
tic as well as international pressure. 
During a constitutional crisis in
1992, the officer corps divided, per­
mitting the election of Guatemala’s 
hum an rights ombudsman as presi­
dent. While President Ramiro de 
Leon Carpio has been forced to 
acquiesce to army demands since 
then, new groups dem anding their 
rights continue to emerge from 
civil society.
No doubt because of Harbury’s 
harsh experiences—she describes 
the death of one friend after an­
o ther—her book fails to acknow­
ledge how Guatemala has changed 
since the early 1980s, instead sub­
merging im portant issues in the po­
tent image of the love-death. The 
reasons go beyond her own tragic 
union with Com andante Everardo,
and probably beyond anything you 
will find in the scholarly literature 
on guerrilla movements.
Long ago ORPA stopped trying 
to ban romantic love am ong its mil­
itants, many of whom are women.
If Harbury’s stories are represen­
tative, as I believe they are, love— 
comradely as well as rom antic—has 
been one of the mainsprings of rev­
olutionary movement, sharpened 
by the probability that courtships 
and friendships will end in early 
death. Again and again, Harbury 
tells the story of a rom ance cut 
short by sacrifice for the revolution, 
the most recent being that of her 
husband. As for the friendships that 
ended this way, they are countless.
Love—comradely as 
well as romantic—  
has been a 
mainspring of 
revolutionary 
movement, creating 
a martyr’s mythology.
Like nothing else I have read, 
Harbury’s stories explain why mili­
tants accept the probability of an 
early and often horrible demise.
But solidarity activists should be­
ware of the resulting ideology of 
martyrdom that pervades both the 
guerrilla armies of the URNG and 
the popular organizations allied 
with them. The living feel an obli­
gation to continue the arm ed strug­
gle that has taken so many of their 
comrades, but martyrs can no 
longer speak, and their memory 
can be used to avoid reassessing 
strategies that they might now want 
to change.
Yet, what if Harbury is right, that 
broad masses of Guatemalans sup­
port guerrilla warfare, but are sim­
ply afraid to say how they feel? Af­
ter all, understanding how people 
feel in a repressed society is no t an 
easy task. My own approach, as a re­
searcher rather than an activist, 
was to live in a Mayan area that was 
a guerrilla stronghold at the start 
of the 1980s. This area was harshly 
repressed by the army and now 
claims to be neutral.
How do I know if my sources tell 
me how they really feel? There is 
no way to know with absolute cer­
tainty, but the willingness of so 
many of them  to dam n both the 
army and the guerrillas convinced 
me that, when they say they want 
the war to stop as soon as possible,
I have to take their statements at 
face value. The cost of protracted 
war is too immediate and the hypo­
thetical benefits of lengthy negotia­
tions too rem ote for people whose 
daily struggle to exist continues to 
be complicated by the URNG as 
well as the army.
Outside the organized left, it is 
easier to find Guatemalans who 
place their hopes in emigration to 
the US, or personal religious con­
version, or even international hu­
man rights observers, than in 
heroic figures like Com andante 
Everardo. O ne reason is that, when 
guerrillas draw soldiers in hot pur­
suit, they often failed to protect 
civilians from the army’s reprisals. 
Survivors get their “consciousness 
raised,” but this includes the reali­
zation that, had the guerrillas 
never appeared, their loved ones 
would probably still be alive.
Significantly, Harbury’s voices 
are all from the revolutionary van­
guard, not from the many bystand­
ers who never asked the guerrillas 
to attack the army on their door­
step and who have suffered so 
many of the casualties. As a result, 
her testimonies fail to capture the 
many nuances of suspicion and an­
ger as well as sympathy that non­
activists feel toward the guerrillas. 
Guerrillaphile North Americans 
(including myself, until recently) 
need to recognize that casting one’s 
lot with a guerrilla movement
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makes it harder to see how little 
support there often is for it—if not 
in the full flush of revolutionary 
mobilization, then later as armed 
struggle becomes as interm inable 
as trench warfare.
In all of Latin America, only 
Colombia has bled from a longer 
civil war, and there the left is deep­
ly divided over w hether to continue 
arm ed struggle. Unfortunately, this 
debate has yet to come out of the 
closet on the Guatemalan left, even 
though the guerrillas are too weak 
to extract significant concessions 
from the army and vow to continue 
fighting until they do—hence the 
ever-stalemated peace talks that, 
since 1991, have failed to produce 
an agreement.
Unarmed Scapegoats
Meanwhile, URNG ambushes do 
not increase the Guatemalan secu­
rity forces’ respect for the law. To 
the contrary, guerrilla attacks 
strengthen army hard-liners who 
oppose making any concessions to 
the left. W hen there was no chance 
of extracting due process from the 
out-of-control military dictatorships 
of the 1970s and early 1980s, this 
may no t have been so important. 
But now that more political space 
has opened up, armed struggle re­
inforces the Guatemalan army’s 
rationale for dom inating national 
life. W hen guerrillas attack the 
army in proximity to peaceful pro­
tests, unarm ed activists become en­
dangered scapegoats.
Unlike Harbury, I do not believe 
the URNG has gained much ground 
in the last three years of peace talks. 
Even though the URNG has prob­
ably given m ore ground than the 
government, both sides have come 
to look intransigent. Occasionally, 
my Mayan interviewees wonder if 
the two sides are working together 
to keep everyone else under the gun.
That peace talks started at all 
was due less to URNG’s domestic 
strength than to international pres­
sure on the government. Unfortu­
nately, international pressure has 
been unable to break the para­
doxical convergence of interests 
between the two armed groups. 
Subversion justifies a counterinsur­
gency state, and the army’s hum an 
rights abuses justify the URNG’s 
arm ed resistance. Each side’s activi­
ties provide powerful rationales for 
the o ther’s, permitting both to im­
pose their priorities on the rest of 
the society, much of which does 
not feel represented by either.
The Mayan peasants with whom 
I talk cannot see the point of the 
URNG continuing the war, and as 
a result neither can I. Giving up 
the arm ed struggle for little in re­
turn may still be unthinkable for 
most of the Guatemalan left, but if 
it ever wants to organize broadly 
again, it may have to do just that.
Captured guerrillas like Coman­
dante Everardo have every right to 
international safeguards. Harbury’s 
campaign is a courageous one that 
deserves the support of the larger 
hum an rights community. She has 
increased international pressure 
on the army by publicizing how it 
treats its prisoners. Yet, now that
m ore political space exists, activists 
cannot ignore the contradictions 
between working for hum an rights 
and supporting armed struggle— 
that is, dem anding that a govern­
m ent respect due process while 
implicitly supporting arm ed attacks 
on its agents.
Bridge of Courage suggests the 
close ties that can develop between 
hum an rights work and support for 
a guerrilla movement, and how in­
ternational activism can become a 
substitute for grassroots domestic 
support. Guatemalans want their 
rights and deserve m ore interna­
tional support than they are get­
ting. It is im portant, however, to 
discern between the dem and for 
hum an rights as a plea for due 
process and the call for those same 
rights as a justification for an insur­
gency that is going nowhere. ■
Editor’s Note: The “Where is Everardo?” 
campaign can be contacted at P. O. Box 
650054, Austin, Texas 78765; (512) 
473-7149.
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Chiapas in the Wider World
by Marian Goslinga
T he unexpected em ergence of an armed insurrection in Mexico on January 1, 1994— the first day the North American Free Trade Agreem ent went into effect—has brought to the fore not only the growing vulnerability and the loss of legitimacy of Mexico’s ruling Partido Revolucionario Institucional but also the limits of popular tolerance for economic reform. Named for Emiliano Zapata—the legendary figure of the Mexican revolution who fought for land reform and campesino rights under the banner “Tierra o libertad”— the Ejercito Zapatista de Liberation Nacional is primarily m ade up of peasants who are dem anding a host 
of democratic reforms.
The state of Chiapas is the poorest and most backward in Mexico. According to the 1990 census, 26% of the state’s 
3.2 million inhabitants speak no Spanish and identify themselves as Indians rather than as Mexicans. To restore peace 
and a sense of national unity, the Mexican government must not only im plem ent social and political reforms in Chia­
pas but extend the reforms on a national basis.
Ancient Mesoamerica: A Compari­
son o f Change in Three Regions.
Richard E. Blanton et al., eds. 2d ed. 
New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 1993. 284 p.
Antidotes to Regionalism: Responses 
to Trade Diversion Effects o f the 
North American Free Trade Agree­
ment. Richard H. Steinberg. Stan­
ford Journal of International Law, v.
29, no. 2 (Summer 1993), p. 315-53.
Calendario y religion entre los 
zapotecos. Jose Alcina Franch. 
Mexico, DF: Instituto de Investi- 
gaciones Historicas, Universidad 
Nacional Autonoma de Mexico, 
1993. 458 p.
Can NAFTA Change Mexico? Jorge 
G. Castaneda. Foreign Affairs, v. 72, 
no. 4 (Septem ber/O ctober 1993), 
p. 66-80.
Carlos Salinas ante la democracia.
Jose Ignacio Rodriguez Reyna. Este 
Pais, no. 25 (May 1993), p. 2-10.
Marian Goslinga is the Latin Ameri­
can and Caribbean librarian at Florida 
International University.
Chiapas: un medico por cada 1,500 
habitantes, 30% de analfabetismo, 
34% de las comunidades sin ener- 
gia electrica, los peores salarios, 
hasta 80% de viviendas con piso de 
tierra. . . . Carlos Acosta Cordova, 
Ignacio Ramirez. Proceso, v. 17, no. 
897 (January 10, 1994), p. 45-49.
Los comandantes del Frente Fara- 
bundo Marti aconsejan a sus cole- 
gas del Ejercito Zapatista. Elias 
Chavez. Proceso, v. 17, no. 898 (Jan­
uary 17, 1994), p. 54-56.
The Conquest o f Mexico: The In­
corporation o f Indian Societies 
into the Western World, 16th- 18th 
Centuries. Serge Gruzinski; Eileen 
Corrigan, tr. Cambridge: Polity, 
1993. 336 p. [Translation of La 
colonisation de I’imaginaire.]
Contesting Authenticity: Batdes 
over the Representation o f History 
in Morelos, Mexico. JoAnn Martin. 
Ethnohistory, v. 40, (Summer 1993), 
p. 438-65.
Contre-revolution au Mexique.
Henri Favre. Etudes, v. 378, no. 2 
(February 1993), p. 171-82.
La debilidad de un Estado fuerte.
Augusto Bolivar Espinoza et al. El
Cotidiano, v. 9, no. 53 (March-April 
1993), p. 60-68.
La desigualdad norte-sur presente 
en Mexico: Monterey, la opulen- 
cia—Oaxaca, la pobreza. Salvador 
Corro, Antonio Jaquez. Proceso, v. 16, 
no. 844 (January 4, 1994), p. 14-17.
Economic and Political Liberalisa­
tion in South Korea and Mexico.
Nora Hamilton, Eun Mee Kim.
Third World Quarterly, v. 14, no. 1 
(1993), p. 109-36.
Economic Transformation the 
Mexican Way. Pedro Aspe. Cam­
bridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1993.
280 p.
En Chiapas descubren un campo de 
entrenamiento de grupos armados.
Guillermo Correa, Julio Lopez C. 
Proceso, v. 16, no. 877 (August 23, 
1993), p. 14-16. [Confirms the exis­
tence of a guerrilla training camp 
in southern Mexico despite state­
ments to the contrary by former 
Chiapas governor Patrocinio Gon­
zalez Garrido.]
The Evolution of the Mexican Po­
litical System. Jaime E. Rodriguez ()., 
ed. Wilmington, Del.: Scholarly Re­
sources, 1993. 322 p.
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El EZLN (Ejercito Zapatista de 
Liberation National) y su politica 
de comunicacion: formal en sus 
comunicados, chocarrera con los 
periodistas. Carlos Marin. Proceso, 
v. 17, no. 899 (January 24, 1994), 
p. 20-25.
Hay guerrilleros en Chiapas desde 
hace ocho anos. Guillermo Correa. 
Proceso, v. 16, no. 880, p. 12-15.
La identidad nacional y los indios: 
el caso de los yaquis y los mayas.
Alejandro Figueroa Valenzuela. 
Sociologia, v. 8, no. 21 (January- 
April 1993), p. 209-25.
Identidad nacional y nacionalismo 
en Mexico. Maria Garcia Castro. 
Sociologia, v. 8, no. 21 (January- 
April 1993), p. 31-41.
Indiens du Mexique. Christian 
Rudel. Etudes, v. 378, no. 2 (Feb­
ruary 1993), p. 159-69.
Into the Spotlight: A Survey of 
Mexico. Christopher Wood. The 
Economist (London), v. 326 (Febru­
ary 13, 1993). [Includes a 22-page 
section that discusses the internal 
and external impact of the Salinas 
adm inistration’s economic policies 
(including the North American 
Free Trade Agreem ent and rural 
development) and the outlook for 
political reform.]
The Land Market in Mexico under 
Salinas: A Real-Estate Boom Revis­
ited? G. Jones et al. Environment 
and Planning A., v. 25 (May 1993), 
p. 627-51.
Los limites del cambio politico.
Luis Rubio. Nexos (July 1993), p. 63.
The Mexican Revolution and the 
Limits o f Agrarian Reform, 1915- 
1946. Dana Markiewicz. Boulder, 
Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 1993. 214 p.
The Mexicans: An Inside View o f a 
Changing Society. Paula Rae Heus- 
inkveld. W orthington, Ohio: Renais­
sance Publications, 1993. 105 p.
Mexico through Foreign Eyes, 1850- 
1990. Carole Naggar, Fred Ritchineds, 
eds. New York: W. W. Norton, 1993. 
320 p.
Mexico’s Long Crisis: Toward New 
Regimes of Accumulation and 
Domination. Edward J. McCaughan. 
Latin American Perspectives, v. 20 
(Summer 1993), p. 6-31.
Mexico. Andrew Coe. Sevenoaks, 
Eng.: H odder & Stoughton, 1993. 
343 p.
Mexico, James Tickell, Oliver Tickell. 
4th ed. London: Mitchell-Beazley, 
1993. 361 p.
Mexico: Dilemmas o f Transition.
Neil Haruey, ed. New York: St. Mar­
tin’s Press, 1993. 381 p.
Militares y sacerdotes se enfrentan 
por el caso de los dos oficiales ase- 
sinados e incinerados en Chiapas.
Armando Guzman, Rodrigo Vera. 
Proceso, v. 16 (April 12, 1993), p. 6-9. 
[Discusses how the Mexican army 
terrorized the indigenous commu­
nity of San Isidro El Ocotal.]
Modernization and Change in Mex­
ico: La Zacualpa Rubber Plantation, 
1890-1920. Peter V. N. Henderson.
Hispanic American Historical Review, 
v. 73, no. 2 (May 1993), p. 235-60.
Modernization, Economic Crisis, 
and Electoral Alignment in Mexico.
Joseph L. Klesner. Mexican Studies/ 
Estudios Mexicanos, v. 9, no. 2 (Sum­
m er 1993), p. 187-223.
La nouvelle revolution mexicaine.
Michel Faure. Express (January 15, 
1993), p. 39-43. [Discusses the prob­
able impact of the North American 
Free Trade Agreem ent on Mexico’s 
economic development.]
Nouvelles politiques d’ajustement 
et de re-legitimation de l’Etat au 
Mexique: le role du “PRONASOL” 
et de la privatisation des entreprises 
publiques. Victor M. Soria. Revue 
Tiers-monde, v. 34, no. 135 (July- 
Septem ber 1993), p. 603-23.
Nuevos tiempos de coyuntura: 
consolidation del cambio y mucho 
desafio politico. Augusto Bolivar Es­
pinoza et al. El Cotidiano, v. 8, no. 52 
(January-February 1993), p. 60-66.
Oil and Revolution in Mexico.
Jonathan Charles Brown. Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1993. 
453 p.
Los organismos de vivienda de los 
asalariados y la politica social. Alicia 
Ziccardi. EURE, v. 19, no. 57 (July
1993), p. 95-102.
Parties and Society in Mexico and 
Venezuela: Why Competition Mat­
ters. Michael Coppedge. Compara­
tive Politics, v. 25, no. 3 (April 1993), 
p. 253-74.
Persistent Oligarchs: Elites and 
Politics in Chihuahua, Mexico, 
1910-1940. Mark Wasserman. Dur­
ham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 
1993. 265 p.
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Politica agricola y maiz en Mexico: 
hacia el libre comercio norteameri- 
cano. Salomon Salcedo, Jose Al­
berto Garcia, Myriam Sagarnaga. 
Comercio exterior, v. 43. no. 4 (April
1993), p. 302-10.
Political and Economic Liberaliza­
tion in Mexico: At a Critical Junc­
ture? Riordan Roett, ed. Boulder, 
Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 1993. 185 p.
Politics in Mexico. Roderic Ai Camp. 
New York: Oxford University Press, 
1993. 200 p.
Recuento de agravios, muchos 
cometidos por la tropa, contra los 
indigenas chiapanecos. Raul Monge. 
Proceso, v. 17, no. 897 (January 10,
1994), p. 32-37.
Reforma del Estado y liberalismo 
social: ^nuevos referentes de identi­
dad politica? Laura A. Moya Lopez. 
Sociologia, v. 8, no. 21 (January-April 
1993), p. 65-85. [Analyzes the ideo­
logical redefinition of the Partido 
Revolucionario Institucional and 
the liberalization of its social values.]
La segunda revolution mexicana 
podria unir a los pueblos de Ame­
rica. Gerardo O choa Sandy. Proceso, 
v. 17, no. 899 (January 24, 1994). 
p. 54-57.
Social Welfare Policy and Political 
Opening in Mexico. Peter M. Ward. 
Journal of Latin American Studies, v. 
25, pt. 3 (October 1993), p. 613-28.
The Southeast Frontier o f New 
Spain. Peter Gerhard. Rev. ed. Nor­
man: University of Oklahoma Press, 
1993. 219 p.
La sucesion presidential de 1994.
Nexos, v. 16, no. 188 (August 1993), 
p. 27-70. [Collection of 13 brief arti­
cles on the upcoming presidental 
election.]
El talon de Aquiles de la reforma 
economica. Luis Rubio F. Vuelta, 
v. 17, no. 200 (July 1993), p. 36-39.
Tradition and the New Social Move­
ments: The Politics of Isthmus 
Zapotec Culture. Howard Campbell.
Latin American Perspectives, v. 20 
(Summer 1993), p. 83-97.
Transition politica: ;hacia donde?
Arturo Anguiano. El Cotidiano, v. 8, 
no. 52 (January-February 1993), 
p. 3-9.
Violencia y cultura politica: un 
desaflo para nuestro tiempo. Jose 
Antonio Viera Gallo. Mensaje, v. 42, 
no. 417 (March-April 1993), p. 69- 
73.
Zapata and the City Boys: In Search 
of a Piece o f the Revolution. Sa­
muel Brunk. Hispanic American His­
torical Review, v. 73, no. 1 (February
1993), p. 33-65.
The Network of Educators on the Americas (NECA) distributes additional titles for teaching about the Am ericas. Request a catalogue. For 
exam ple the Caribbean Connections series includes titles on Puerto Rico ($12), Jamaica ($12) and Overview of Regional History ($15.95) 
(+ $3 postage for each book.) “Here are the voices o f  Puerto Rican workers, w om en, activists, w riters and m usicians. Puerto Rican students 
will find their heritage presented here with know ledge and dignity. Students and teachers o f  o ther backgrounds will enjoy a w onderful and 
informed introduction to Puerto Rican life today.” - Dr. R ina B enm ayor, Center fo r Puerto Rican Studies, Hunter College.
Readings and teaching 
ideas in English and 
Spanish on the conquest 
and its legacy
For K-Adult Spanish, Bi­
lingual, English and Social 
Studies classes.
Edited by Amoldo Ramos, 
Gioconda Belli, et al.
Poetry and prose by Latin Ameri­
can and Caribbean authors such 
as Claribel Alegria, Manlio 
Argueta, Pedro Albizu Campos, 
Ernesto Cardenal, Ruben Dario, 
Eduardo Galeano, Nicolas 
Guillen, Pablo Neruda, Gabriel 
Garcia Marquez, Rigoberta 
Menchu, Cesar Vallejo, and more.
Order Now: Single copies: $5 + $3 
shipping. Bulk 10-49: $2 each; 50499: 
$1.50 each; 500+: $1 each. Must add for 
shipping: $8 for first 10-100, $6/100 
thereafter. I.S.B.N. 1-878554-09-3, 
96pp, © 1992, NECA.
S en d  check , p u rc h a s e  o r d e r  o r  in q u ir ie s
to  NECA, 1118 22nd St, NW 
Washington, DC 20037
202-429-0137, Fax: 202-429-9766.
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cano. Salomon Salcedo, Jose Al­
berto Garcia, Myriam Sagarnaga. 
Comercio exterior, v. 43. no. 4 (April
1993), p. 302-10.
Political and Economic Liberaliza­
tion in Mexico: At a Critical Junc­
ture? Riordan Roett, ed. Boulder, 
Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 1993. 185 p.
Politics in Mexico. Roderic Ai Camp. 
New York: Oxford University Press,
1993. 200 p.
Recuento de agravios, muchos 
cometidos por la tropa, contra los 
indigenas chiapanecos. Raul Monge. 
Proceso, v. 17, no. 897 (January 10,
1994), p. 32-37.
Reforma del Estado y liberalismo 
social: ,inuevos referentes de identi­
dad politica? Laura A. Moya Lopez. 
Sociologia, v. 8, no. 21 (January-April 
1993), p. 65-85. [Analyzes the ideo­
logical redefinition of the Partido 
Revolucionario Institucional and 
the liberalization of its social values.]
La segunda revolution mexicana 
podria unir a los pueblos de Ame­
rica. Gerardo Ochoa Sandy. Proceso, 
v. 17, no. 899 (January 24, 1994). 
p. 54-57.
Social Welfare Policy and Political 
Opening in Mexico. Peter M. Ward.
Journal of Latin American Studies, v. 
25, pt. 3 (October 1993), p. 613-28.
The Southeast Frontier of New 
Spain. Peter Gerhard. Rev. ed. Nor­
man: University o f Oklahoma Press,
1993. 219 p.
La sucesion presidential de 1994.
Nexos, v. 16, no. 188 (August 1993), 
p. 27-70. [Collection of 13 brief arti­
cles on the upcoming presidental 
election.]
IRediscovering America/Redescu
Readings and teaching 
ideas in English and 
Spanish on the conquest 
and its legacy
Poetry and prose by Latin Ameri­
can and Caribbean authors such 
as Claribel Alegria, Manlio 
Argueta, Pedro Albizu Campos, 
Ernesto Cardenal, Ruben Dario, 
Eduardo Galeano, Nicolas 
Guillen, Pablo Neruda, Gabriel 
Garcia Marquez, Rigoberta 
Menchu, Cesar Vallejo, and more.
The Network of Educators on the Americas (NECA) distributes additional titles for teaching 
exam ple the Caribbean Connections series includes titles on Puerto Rico ($12), Jamaica ($12 
(+ $3 postage for each book.) “Here are the voices o f  Puerto Rican workers, wom en, activists 
w ill find their heritage presented here with know ledge and dignity. Students and teachers o f < 
informed introduction to Puerto Rican life today.” - Dr. R ina B enm ayor, Center fo r Puerto Rt
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